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AN UNCERTAIN PRIVILEGE: IMPLIED WAIVER AND
THE EVISCERATION OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Deirdre M. Smith*
An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but re-
sults in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all.'
INTRODUCTION
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is, in many respects, in its nas-
cent years in the federal courts, having been first recognized by the
United States Supreme Court only twelve years ago in Jaffee v. Red-
mond.2 In holding that federal courts must protect confidential com-
munications arising in psychotherapy notwithstanding the "likely
evidentiary benefit" of such communications, the Supreme Court
reasoned:
The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilitat-
ing the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering
the effects of a mental or emotional problem. The mental health of
our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of
transcendent importance.3
Psychotherapy is the context in which, perhaps more than in any
other, a person is most likely to reveal unflattering information about
herself, as well as her fears, vulnerabilities, guilt, disappointments,
doubts, and anxieties. By recognizing the privilege in broad terms, the
Court appeared to create a wall of protection against disclosure of
such statements in litigation, including responses to discovery re-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.A., University of Penn-
sylvania, 1988; J.D., University of Maine School of Law, 1994. I am grateful to the following
people who read earlier drafts of this article and provided many helpful insights: Colin Miller,
Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Deborah Tuerkheimer, and Jennifer Wriggins. I am appreciative of
Dean Peter Pitegoff for providing generous summer research support, and of the staff of the
Donald L. Garbrecht Law Library for its research assistance.
1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981)).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 11.
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quests, 4 marking the first time that the Court had recognized the over-
riding significance of mental health treatment.
Now that Jaffee is in its second decade, we can begin to take stock
of its vitality and impact. In the short time since Jaffee, the federal
courts have created a body of law in disarray, with inconsistent ap-
proaches to enforcement of the privilege found even within the same
district. 5 The source of the chaos is the courts' contradictory treat-
ment of the question of when a civil litigant is deemed to have waived
the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing her mental condition
in issue through the assertion of a particular claim or defense. The
issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege can arise in
any case in which a plaintiff who has received mental health treatment
at some point in her life seeks emotional distress damages. The fed-
eral case law on this question, however, has developed almost exclu-
sively in the context of civil rights cases.6  Since the federal court
system is a primary forum for the vindication of civil rights claims,
such as those alleging discrimination or excessive force, the federal
courts' approaches to the psychotherapist-patient privilege and their
conceptualization of waiver of the privilege can have a crucial impact
on the course of civil rights litigation and on whether litigation even
occurs. 7 Properly framed, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can
serve as a critical tool to ensure that those with mental illness may
enforce their rights under federal law without concern that their
mental health histories will become a central issue in the litigation.
Conversely, waiver formulations can chill federal civil rights litigation,
4. Id. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rules with respect to privileges apply not only
to the admissibility of evidence at trial but to "all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings."
FED. R. EViD. 1101(c).
5. Lynne Bernabei & Andrew Schroeder, Protect Clients' Private Health Records, TRIAL, Sept.
2004, at 32, 33 (noting that it is difficult for a plaintiff's counsel to predict "which theory of
waiver [of the psychotherapist-patient privilege] a court will adopt" due to the lack of uniformity
within jurisdictions). Compare Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006) (rejecting argument that plaintiff waived psychotherapist-patient
privilege by alleging emotional distress damages), with Manessis v. New York City Dep't of
Transp., No. 02-CIV359, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2002) (reaching the oppo-
site conclusion on the same question).
6. Of the dozens of federal cases considering implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege cited herein and otherwise identified during the course of my research, only three arose
outside the civil rights context. See Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No:1:06-CV-211, 2007 WL
3333394, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007) (insurance coverage); Young v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic
Assocs., It, P.C., 2004 WL 1813232 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2004) (medical malpractice); Adams v.
Ardcor, 196 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Wisc. 2000) (industrial accident).
7. Bernabei & Schroeder, supra note 5. at 32 (assuming that plaintiffs likely do not choose in
which forum to litigate a discrimination case, where given a choice, based upon the level of
protection provided to confidential medical records, but noting that the choice of forum can
dictate the degree to which medical records much be disclosed).
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virtually ensuring that some plaintiffs' civil rights will never be
vindicated.
Despite the Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of recog-
nizing and enforcing a psychotherapy patient's right to maintain the
confidentiality of her communications, lower courts have eroded the
privilege beyond recognition through the notion of implied waiver.
While the case law is entirely unsettled, one fact has clearly emerged:
by filing suit in federal court seeking any form of compensation for
psychic injury, a plaintiff runs a substantial risk that her current and
past mental health treatment will become a focus of discovery and
perhaps of the defense theory at trial. With a significant number of
individuals in the United States seeking mental health treatment,8 and
with recent enhancement of remedies available under federal civil
rights laws, 9 courts' expansive views of waiver have resulted in a colli-
sion between plaintiffs' efforts to vindicate their civil rights in federal
court and defendants' ability to exploit the issues that arise in plain-
tiffs' mental health treatment to gain an advantage in litigation. How-
ever, in developing the waiver doctrine, courts utterly fail to weigh the
potential impact on future plaintiffs' decisions whether to pursue civil
rights claims at all.
Prior scholarship on the development of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in federal courts has noted the sharp division in the courts on
the issue of waiver. 10 This scholarship, however, has neither consid-
ered the broader impact of such uncertainty on the role of federal
courts in protecting civil rights nor advanced an alternative configura-
tion of waiver to be adopted in this context. This Article analyzes the
questions implicated by waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege and proposes a reasoned and coherent approach to resolving
waiver disputes to ensure that the concept of waiver does not vitiate
8. Studies conducted in 1993 and 1996 estimated that approximately eleven percent of adults
in the United States received professional mental health treatment each year. Ronald C. Kessler
et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness, 36 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 987 (2001); Darrel A. Regier et al., The De Facto US Mental and Addictive Disorders Ser-
vice System. Epidemiologic Catchment Area Prospective 1-Year Prevalence Rates of Disorders
and Services, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 1993, at 85. The United States Surgeon
General cited both articles in Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General (1999), at ch. 2,
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec7.html.
9. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Robert H. Aronson, The Mental Health Provider Privilege in the Wake of Jaffee v.
Redmond, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 591 (2001); Ryan M. Gott, Note, The Evolving Treatment of "Gar-
den-Variety" Claims Under the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 6 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App.
ADVOC. 91 (2001); Ellen E. McDonnell, Note, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow
Waiver of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1369
(2001).
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the privilege entirely and therefore undermine the important purposes
it serves.
Part II of this Article examines the role of mental health evidence
during discovery in civil litigation, particularly in federal civil rights
cases, the context in which the issues of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege and waiver issues generally arise." Part III then traces the
origins of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the Supreme
Court's Jaffee opinion and reviews the various assumptions and ratio-
nales that shaped the debate regarding the development of the privi-
lege in the state legislatures and eventually in the federal courts. 12
Part IV reviews and critiques the post-Jaffee case law regarding im-
plied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 13 The courts' in-
consistent approaches stem from the significant variation in their
conceptualizations of the privilege and of waiver, as well as the under-
lying rationales of each. Federal courts too often fail to apply the
broader principles implicated by questions of whether one has waived
a legally protected right. Most significantly, courts do not predicate a
finding of waiver on whether the holder of that right took some af-
firmative step that can be properly characterized as waiving the right.
Instead, under the guise of implied waiver, many courts analyze the
controversy employing considerations of privacy and fairness devel-
oped under the rules governing discovery procedure. Others allow
conceptions of relevance and evidentiary value-expressly disallowed
by Jaffe-to creep into or dominate the analysis of waiver questions.
Such considerations, however, have no place in a determination of
waiver.
In Part V, the Article proposes a new framework for analyzing is-
sues of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, especially in
the discovery context. 14 It first offers an alternative conceptualization
of the underlying rationale of the privilege. Specifically, the privilege
encourages individuals to seek remedies for violations of their civil
rights who might otherwise be discouraged from doing so out of fear
that their mental health treatment history will become a central issue
in the litigation. Part V then advances a new approach that is consis-
tent with both the Supreme Court's formulation of the privilege in
Jaffee and with the broader principles applicable to questions of
waiver.15 Part VI concludes that the Supreme Court must provide
11. See infra notes 17-44 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 45-132 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 133-324 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 325-349 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 350-394 and accompanying text.
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guidance to lower courts on the issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege in order to preserve meaningful access to the federal
courts for all individuals, regardless of their history of mental health
treatment. 1
6
II. DISCOVERY OF MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS
-IN CIVIL LITIGATION
The operation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is at issue
most often and most contentiously when a defendant in a civil action
involving claims for emotional distress damages seeks records, testi-
mony, and other information regarding a plaintiff's current and past
mental health treatment. 17 Unrestricted access to a plaintiff's mental
health records, particularly notes and records from psychotherapy ses-
sions and diagnostic evaluations, can yield some of the most valuable
discovery to a defendant. Such records may provide the most direct
and uninfluenced view of the plaintiff, her life, her opinions, her per-
sonality, and her vulnerabilities. 18 Mental health records may contain
admissions about the incident at issue in the litigation, or even the
plaintiff's impressions of the litigation itself. Alternatively, mental
health records may place the incident at issue in the litigation in con-
text by revealing other circumstances in the plaintiff's life, such as
marital problems and struggles with childhood trauma. 19
By contrast, other forms of discovery generally yield less useful in-
formation. Non-psychotherapy medical records tend to reveal little,
as physicians typically do not record-or later recollect-a patient's
statements during a fifteen-minute office visit. Plaintiffs' lawyers draft
interrogatory answers with the object of disclosing as little as possible.
Depositions occur once litigation is underway, after extensive prepa-
ration sessions with counsel, and when a litigant is quite guarded
about making revelations in response to questions from opposing
counsel. Psychotherapy records, however, contain few similar mediat-
16. See infra notes 395-400 and accompanying text.
17. See Michael L. Orenstein, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 20 TOURO L. REV. 679,
679 (2004) (noting that the issue of privilege generally arises when a defendant is seeking a
plaintiff's mental health records).
18. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("The psychiatric patient
confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not only what
his words directly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his
shame." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952))).
19. Albert M. Drukteinis notes that a "critical factor" in determining causation in "mental
damage" claims is "longitudinal life history." Albert M. Drukteinis, Understanding and Evaluat-
ing Mental Damages, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, available at http://www.psychiatric
times.com/display/article/10168/55241.
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ing influences. The information is as close to a peek into a litigant's
mind as one can presently achieve through discovery. 20 Thus, defend-
ants' attorneys are highly motivated to develop creative arguments to
gain access to such records, and plaintiffs' attorneys are at least as
equally motivated to resist such arguments.
The most commonly offered rationale by civil defendants in support
of their discovery requests for psychotherapy records is a plaintiff's
claim for emotional distress damages.21 In the 1990s, a confluence of
factors transformed the landscape of emotional distress damages in
federal civil rights actions, which themselves comprise a substantial
proportion of civil matters in which plaintiffs seek recovery for per-
sonal injuries.22 Prior to that time, the primary vehicles for collecting
emotional distress damages in federal courts were either tort actions
based upon diversity of the parties, or civil rights actions brought pur-
suant to § 1983,23 through which plaintiffs could receive most state-
law tort remedies.24 In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), which greatly expanded the reach of the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act to include a signif-
icant number of public and private entities and employers.2 5 A year
later, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,26 which extended
the right to seek compensatory damages, including damages for emo-
20. Access to treatment notes covering treatment prior to the litigation, or even the incident
at issue, can be particularly valuable since it avoids the common "contaminating factors" that
can be present in forensic psychological examinations. Id.
21. See, e.g., Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131, 133 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
22. In 2007, civil rights complaints comprised twelve percent of all civil case filings in the
federal courts, a figure slightly lower than the number of personal injury and product liability
filings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2007.pl (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). The remaining catego-
ries of civil filings (e.g. social security, prisoner filings, forfeitures, contracts, intellectual property
matters) do not generally involve recovery for personal injuries.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
24. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 82 (2000) ("Section 1983 authorizes tort claims for
deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.").
25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34 (2000 & Supp. II 2008);
see also Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981A (2000)); see § 1981A(b)(3) (listing damages available to victims of intentional discrimi-
nation as including compensatory damages for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffer-
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses").
The award of damages is subject to caps, based upon the size of the employer. § 1981A(b)(3).
In recent years, an increasing number of clinical studies have documented the potential psycho-
logical impact of discrimination. See generally SHARYN ANN LENHART, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES AND
TREATMENT INTERVENTIONS (2004); Melba J.T. Vasquez et al., Assessing Employment Discrimi-
nation and Harassment, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 259-74
(Alan Goldstein ed., 2003).
2008] PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 85
tional distress, to employment discrimination plaintiffs pursuing
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427 and the
ADA. 28
As a result of these two statutes, mental health issues quickly be-
came predominant in employment discrimination cases.29 Whereas
previously employers' attorneys argued that access to a plaintiff's
mental health records was necessary to defend on the issue of liabil-
ity,30 the availability of emotional distress damages and the expansion
of discrimination claims based upon mental illness enhanced the rele-
vancy arguments regarding access to these records. 31 The same year
of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, public awareness of
sexual harassment brought about by the confirmation hearings of
Clarence Thomas may have led to a multifold increase in sexual har-
assment claims.32 These trends were well underway when the Su-
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-3 (2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34 (2000 & Supp. II 2008).
29. James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine B. Kulick, Preface to MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJU-
RIES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION Xxxvi-xxxvii (James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine B. Kulick
eds., 2001) [hereinafter MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES].
30. See, e.g., id. at 219 (explaining that an employee's pre-existing "personality disorder" may
"produce cognitive distortions and unreasonable expectations and demands that may impact
liability issues in an employment lawsuit"); see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118
F.R.D. 525, 531 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (denying discovery of sexual harassment plaintiff's mental
health treatment where defendant sought to establish plaintiff's "hypersensitivity to
pornography").
31. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employment discrimination plain-
tiffs frequently included separate tort claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a means to seek compensatory damages for emotional distress. See, e.g., Green v.
Am. Broad. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D.D.C. 1986). However, plaintiffs must prove each of
the elements of those torts in order to recover emotional distress damages and such efforts are
not always successful. Id. at 1362-64 (granting summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Also, some courts have held that such tort
claims are pre-empted by state workers' compensation statutes. See generally Jarod S. Gonzales,
State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common Law Torts: Valuing the
Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115 (2007).
32. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filings reflected a more than twofold in-
crease in sexual harassment cases over a five-year period, from 6127 in 1991 to 15,342 in 1996.
Jennifer Steinhauer, If the Boss is Out of Line, What's the Legal Boundary? Testing a Wider
Concept of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at Dl. See also Noelle C. Brennan,
Comment, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: The Hostile Environment of a Courtroom,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 545, 545 n.3 (1995) ("In the three months following the Clarence Thomas
confirmation hearings, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported a
70% increase in reports of sexual harassment, as compared to the previous year."); Allen R.
Myerson, As Federal Bias Cases Drop, Workers Take Up the Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12. 1997, at 1
(reviewing possible causes of increase in employment discrimination filings and noting that
"[e]xperts attribute the growth in sexual-harassment cases to Anita Hill's confrontation of Judge
Clarence Thomas at his Supreme Court confirmation hearings"). However, it is not apparent to
what extent the increase in filings is attributable to the Hill-Thomas controversy or the expan-
sion of available remedies. Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily:
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:79
preme Court first recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
Jaffee in 1996.
A claim for emotional distress damages raises issues of causation,
severity, and sincerity, including whether a plaintiff is accurately stat-
ing the source or extent of her emotional distress. 33 Mental health
records may offer tools for defendants seeking to limit damages by
challenging the claim on any of those aforementioned issues.34 Estab-
lishing causation for emotional distress damages is not a straightfor-
ward task. Given the complexity of the human psyche, a defendant
can argue that anything in a plaintiff's life contributed to her emo-
tional or mental condition. 35 Psychotherapy treatment notes may re-
veal "prior or concurrent alternative stressors, such as childhood
sexual abuse or marital discord," any of which could arguably be a
contributing or alternative cause of emotional distress.36 Thus, de-
fendants have easily fashioned and found support for superficially
valid arguments for a need to obtain a wide range of mental health
New Laws Boost Hopes for Monetary Awards, WASH. POST, May 12, 1997, at Al ("Employment
discrimination cases are surging into the federal courts in record numbers, more than doubling in
the past four years because of new laws and new attitudes in the workplace.").
33. Drukteinis, supra note 19.
34. David A. Cathcart, Emerging Standards Defining Contract, Emotional Distress, and Puni-
tive Damages In Employment Cases, C108 ALI-ABA 547 (1995). Mr. Cathcart explained:
Employers should explore in discovery alternative causes for the plaintiff's alleged
emotional distress. Employers should consult with psychiatric or psychological experts
as necessary or appropriate to develop discovery on injuries and to perform examina-
tion of the plaintiff's mental state. Such matters might include recent divorce, bank-
ruptcy, surgery, accidents, or other traumatic personal events. All prior psychiatric
records of the plaintiff should be requested.
Id.; see John H. Mason & Christopher L. Ekman, Defending Against Damages Claims In Dis-
crimination Cases, 13 LAB. LAW. 471, 495 (1998) ("[Iln order to defend against a claim of emo-
tional distress in a discrimination case, the defendant employer should seek to establish, through
discovery of the plaintiff's medical or psychiatric records or otherwise, possible pre-existing or
alternate sources of the plaintiff's alleged emotional distress."); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Sexual
Harassment Cases in the Courts, or Therapy Goes to War: Supporting a Sexual Harassment Vic-
tim During Litigation, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AND ACADEMIA: PSYCHI-
ATRIC ISSUES 133, 142 (Diane K. Shrier ed., 1996) ("In the effort to minimize [emotional
distress] damages, the defendant's attorney will leave no stone unturned. This is where the dis-
covery process becomes nastiest.").
35. Similarly, defendants have successfully sought and obtained marital counseling records in
loss of consortium claims. See, e.g., Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 622-23 (S.D.
Cal. 1996) (recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege pre-Jaffee, but also finding waiver
based solely upon plaintiffs' claim for loss of consortium as part of an excessive force, wrongful
death claim).
36. James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine B. Kulick, Preparing the Case for the Expert, in
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES, supra note 29, at 262, 272. The authors of this defense-
oriented book suggest several questions to be asked of a discrimination plaintiff for the purpose
of eliciting information about the plaintiff's mental health. Id. at 279-82.
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evidence.37 Defendants who plan to use mental health professionals
as either testifying or consulting experts are particularly motivated to
access as much information as possible about a plaintiff's mental
health history and present condition. 38
At the same time, a plaintiff may be horrified to learn that her psy-
chotherapy history will be made available, not only to the opposing
counsel, but also to the opposing party (perhaps an employer who
subjected her to sexual harassment), the court, the jury, and the gen-
37. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999) ("It is not difficult to consider the many
ways in which it would be argued that the mental conditions of claimants are at issue."); David
A. Robinson, Discovery of the Plaintiffs Mental Health History in an Employment Discrimina-
tion Case, 16 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 55, 59 (1994); see also Zachary D. Fasman, Taking the
Plaintiffs Deposition: The Defense Viewpoint, 712 PLI/LIT 513 (Nov. 2004). The author advises
defense attorneys to cover the following in a deposition of a plaintiff in an employment discrimi-
nation claim:
(40) Where the plaintiff is claiming emotional distress damages, obtain as much infor-
mation as possible about the symptoms which plaintiff claims support emotional dis-
tress: when they began; how severe they were; how they interfered with his/her normal
activities; whether they still do, if not, when they ceased to do so; whether they were
similar in kind or character to anything plaintiff had experienced previously or since.
(41) When plaintiff initially sought treatment for such ailments, and if the treatment
was not sought immediately why not.
(42) Whether plaintiff was suffering from any other problems at or about the time the
symptoms began, and if so what those events were like in comparison to the trauma
suffered at the hands of the employer.
Fasman, supra, at 535. The author further advises defense attorneys to "[i]nquire about the
existence of alternative stressors (e.g., a death in the family, marital and family problems, finan-
cial problems, medical problems) contemporaneous with the alleged stressful events in plaintiff's
workplace" and to "[i]nquire about pre-existing mental disorders and symptoms of emotional
distress. This is a crucial area." Id. at 539, 541 (emphasis added). As a follow-up to the deposi-
tion, the author continues, "if plaintiff has claimed emotional distress damage and has identified
medical practitioners, depose them promptly." Id. at 537. If the therapist took "notes during the
sessions ... subpoena the writings." Id. at 543. But see infra notes 256-284 and accompanying
text, questioning whether the "alternative sources of emotional distress" basis for discovery of
psychotherapy records is consistent with basic notions of the law of tort damages.
38. See, e.g., McDonald & Kulick, supra note 36, at 271 (emphasizing that defense counsel
should obtain and provide to an examining psychiatric expert all mental health records, deposi-
tion transcripts, and similar items in advance of the expert's meeting with the plaintiff). Another
tool frequently used by defense counsel, particularly in sexual harassment cases, is a compelled
mental health examination pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Al-
though this Article provides a brief analysis of the core issues in Rule 35 disputes, infra at notes
285-310 and accompanying text, comprehensive treatment of the scope and application of the
rule is found elsewhere. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales & Priscilla Ray, The Availability of Rule 35
Mental Examinations in Employment Discrimination Cases, 16 REV. LITIG. 1 (1997); Kent D.
Streseman, Note, Headshrinkers, Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts & Sluts: Reexamining
Compelled Mental Examinations in Sexual Harassment Actions Under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1268 (1995).
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eral public. 39 The controversies over the psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege and the discovery of mental health records generally arise in
those cases where a plaintiff chooses not to offer some or all of her
mental health treatment records in support of her claims and resists a
defendant's efforts to obtain such records through discovery. In many
instances in which a plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages, a
plaintiff who has received psychotherapy treatment for such emo-
tional distress will list one or more treating therapists as expert wit-
nesses and plan to introduce some or part of her treatment records as
evidence of her emotional distress. 40 In other cases, however, a plain-
tiff may plan to offer only her own testimony as to the psychological
impact of the defendant's actions. She may have received mental
health treatment for such distress but could choose not to offer the
testimony of her treating therapist. The plaintiff also may have been
in treatment at the time of, or prior to, the incident at the center of the
litigation, and she may attempt to keep all records of such treatment
out of the hands of the defendant's attorney.
Where a plaintiff produces her psychotherapy records in discovery,
she may be asked at her deposition about certain statements she made
in treatment, perhaps with a copy of her therapist's notes in front of
the deposing attorney. Some of the specific content of the psycho-
therapy records may have relatively low value to the defense attorney
in terms of proof of the central issues in contention in the case, such as
liability or the extent of emotional distress damages, but the defense
attorney may use the records to paint a negative picture of the plain-
tiff or to cause embarrassment, thereby improving settlement chances.
For example, notes of psychotherapy sessions after the plaintiff initi-
ates litigation may include references to the plaintiff's feelings about
39. See Bernabei & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 32 (discussing plaintiffs' feelings of "violation"
at having to disclose medical records, especially mental health records, in employment discrimi-
nation cases).
40. Rodney J. S. Deaton et al., The Role of the Mental Health Professional in Employment
Litigation, in MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES, supra note 29, at 50, 58. Indeed, in some
instances, a plaintiff's attorney may refer her to a therapist for evaluation and treatment so as to
ensure that the emotional distress is documented and can be proven through a witness other
than the plaintiff herself. See generally JON R. ABELE, EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: PROVING DAM-
AGES 103-08 (2003) (discussing benefits of offering expert medical testimony in support of
claims for emotional distress).
[Vol. 58:79
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the litigation itself.41 In short, disclosure of such records is of high
value to defendants and correspondingly high cost to plaintiffs.
42
Given the significant value and cost associated with the disclosure
of records from psychotherapeutic treatment in civil litigation, it is not
surprising that, as psychotherapy became more widespread and the
availability of emotional distress damages expanded in federal courts,
the controversies over the role of such records in civil litigation be-
came increasingly common. As discussed in the next section, due
largely to the efforts of psychotherapists and psychiatrists to receive
protection for their professional communications, state legislatures
and later the federal courts fashioned a new privilege to limit the dis-
41. For example, in Maday v. Public Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007), the
plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to preclude the introduction into evidence at trial on her Fam-
ily and Medical Leave Act claim certain statements she had made to her therapist to the effect
that she was "unhappy with her attorney who told her he didn't want to be used as a tool for her
revenge." Id. at 820. The defendant's attorney argued in response to the plaintiff's objection:
"She's depressed, it makes reference to her mood, and we're entitled to explore and argue any-
thing that would have [an] impact on her mood." Id. at 820-21. The appeals court affirmed the
trial court's admission of the record on the basis that she had waived her psychotherapist-patient
privilege by alleging emotional distress damages. Id. at 821. The court concluded that the trial
court's admissibility analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 was "reasonable." Id.; see also
Murray v. Bd. of Educ., 199 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (requiring plaintiff in an employ-
ment discrimination case to disclose those portions of her psychotherapist's notes that revealed
references to and communications with her attorney in that case).
42. In addition to these factors, other consequences may flow from the release of psychother-
apy records in litigation. There is a real risk, which likely cannot be quantified or proven, that a
fact finder would use such evidence impermissibly at trial to judge a plaintiff's character, credi-
bility, or likeability. There is little question that stigma, discrimination, and prejudice against
people with mental illness continue to pervade American society. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE
HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 21-24, 39-43 (2000) (describing the nature
and pervasiveness of sanism); SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 5 (2001)
("Social science research confirms that mental illness is one of the most-if not the most-
stigmatized of social conditions."); Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental
Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 401 (2006) ("Social discrimination against
people with mental illness is widespread."). What is far from certain, however, is what impact
these factors may have on juror decision making. See EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN,
DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 52 (2003). The authors note:
Data are especially paltry on the effects of plaintiff characteristics on noneconomic
damages (related to intangibles such as the plaintiff's physical and mental distress, pain
and suffering, loss of consortium, etc.) despite the fact that there are significant hori-
zontal inequities in compensation for these losses.... [N]o studies have examined how
jurors perceive the amount of pain and suffering experienced by different kinds of
plaintiffs and how they translate those perceptions into a judgment about
compensation.
Id.; see Edith Greene et al., Juror Decisions about Damages in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 107, 108 (1999) ("Whether juries are competent to make reasonable
assessments of claims for lost wages and pain and suffering in age and other discrimination cases
is unknown.").
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closure of such records. 43 However, as discussed in Part IV, this tool
is of limited effect as federal courts apply a broad conceptualization of
waiver to the privilege, which enables defendants' attorneys to gain
access to such records in most cases in which the records are sought.44
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The controversies that surround the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege and its application to civil litigation in federal courts trace their
origins to the development of the privilege itself. The contemporary
case law addressing questions of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege reflects the long-standing resistance to the expansion of testi-
monial privileges first to physicians and later to psychotherapists. In-
deed, as Part IV explains, in many respects, the broad view of waiver
is simply a reconfiguration of the classic arguments against the
privilege .45
A. Origins of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
The psychotherapist-patient privilege developed in the second half
of the twentieth century in the face of strong hostility to evidentiary
privileges in Anglo-American law. Privilege law generally reflects and
concerns "extrinsic social policy," perhaps more so than any other
realm of evidence. 46 While other evidentiary rules aim to improve the
reliability of evidence, leading to enhanced truth-seeking by fact find-
ers and more efficient trials, privileges provide benefits outside adju-
dication, such as the preservation or protection of certain
interpersonal relationships. Such purposes are central to many evi-
dentiary privileges recognized today, including those shielding com-
munications arising in marital, attorney-client, and clergy-believer
relationships. 47 As a result, privileges are antithetical to the primary
object of evidentiary trials, as expressed in one of the oft-cited maxims
in privilege cases: "The public [] has a right to every man's
evidence.'"48
43. See infra notes 69-132 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 133-324 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 227-255 and accompanying text.
46. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 1.1, at 3
(2002).
47. Id. § 1.1, at 4 (noting that numerous witnesses at the Congressional hearings on the pro-
posed federal rules of evidence commented that "unlike most evidentiary rules, privileges pro-
tect interpersonal relationships outside of the courtroom").
48. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
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Few evidentiary privileges were recognized at common law and,
therefore, state legislatures took the lead in establishing new privi-
leges from the nineteenth century to the present.49 Privilege law often
reflects a struggle between legislatures and courts, in which the latter
take a narrow view of the codified privileges established by the for-
mer.50  Indeed, many privileges-including the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege-came about by intensive lobbying efforts by
professionals seeking special status for their communications. 51
Judges resented and resisted restrictions on their authority to make
evidentiary rulings, particularly where the restrictions resulted in the
exclusion of evidence that was quite often plainly relevant to the is-
sues before the court.52
Dean John Henry Wigmore, considered the preeminent American
evidence scholar in the early twentieth century, notably opposed the
wide recognition of evidentiary privileges.5 3 Scholars such as Wig-
more, who took a rationalist and empiricist approach to evidence, 54
expressed skepticism that most privileges were truly necessary as
mechanisms in social relationships.55 Wigmore questioned any "hu-
manistic rationales" for privileges where an empirical basis was lack-
ing.56 That skepticism led him to dismiss most proposed privileges. 57
Wigmore urged courts to take an approach of strict construction to the
49. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.1, at 147.
50. Id. § 3.2.2, at 127.
51. Id. at 128.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 3.1, at 119-22.
54. Id. § 3.1, at 121, § 3.2.1, at 125. Another early critic of privileges, and one who influenced
Wigmore's approach, was the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who wrote that privileges
and other exclusionary rules interfered with the "natural" process of fact finding. Id. § 2.5, at
113-17. He also dismissed the proffered rationales for privileges because there was no empirical
proof to support them. Id. § 2.5, at 113-17. As Bentham once stated: "Evidence is the basis for
justice: exclude evidence and you exclude justice." 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDI-
CIAL EVIDENCE 38 (1827).
55. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 3.2.1, at 124-25, § 3.2.3, at 130-31.
56. Id. § 3.2.1, at 124-25. Wigmore dismissed humanistic rationales as mere "sentiments." Id.
at 125.
57. Wigmore developed an influential four-part test for privilege and argued that only a small
handful of asserted privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, fulfilled the requirements:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedu-
lously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton
rev. 1961) (emphasis omitted).
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new privileges, and courts have generally heeded that suggestion.58
Wigmore's writings continue to pervade contemporary judicial opin-
ions, as courts note that privileges are disfavored, are to be construed
strictly, and ultimately impede truth-seeking.59
The physician-patient privilege, a forerunner of the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege, was among those privileges that legislatures en-
acted and courts resisted.60 By the turn of the twentieth century,
several states had enacted a physician-patient privilege of some
kind.61 Commentators' criticisms of the new privilege, including those
by Wigmore himself, were "vociferous. ' 62 One of the most-cited and
influential attacks on the privilege was that of Harvard Professor
Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., who wrote that "[s]ecrecy in court is prima
facie calamitous, and is permissible only when we are very sure that
frankness will do more harm than good. '63
The same year of Chaffee's call for abolition of the physician-pa-
tient privilege, the American Law Institute's Committee on Evidence
issued a Model Code of Evidence. 64 Initial drafts of the Model Code
contained no provision for a physician-patient privilege, but attorneys
from jurisdictions that already recognized such privilege lobbied for
its inclusion in the final draft.65 The rules provided for several fairly
broad exceptions to the privilege, including what is now commonly
referred to as a "patient-litigant exception":
There is no [physician-patient] privilege ... in an action in which the
condition of the patient is an element or factor of the claim or de-
fense of the patient or of any party claiming through or under the
patient or claiming as a beneficiary of the patient through a contract
to which the patient is or was a party. 66
58. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 3.2.2, at 129.
59. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying Wigmore's four-
part test in declining to recognize a parent-child privilege).
60. In 1828, the New York Legislature enacted the first state law codifying a physician-patient
privilege. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.1, at 147 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829, Vol. II, Part
III, c-7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73).
61. 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 5522, at 68 (West 1989).
62. Id. § 5522, at 70. Many rejected the privilege by employing Wigmore's four conditions,
essentially an instrumental and utilitarian approach. Id. § 5522, at 76; see also Comment, Waiver
of a Patient's Privilege, 31 YALE L.J. 529, 529-30 (1922) (noting that many legislatures have
enacted such privileges in the face of "much hostile criticism").
63. Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by
Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 609 (1942).
64. MODEL CODE EVID. (1942). The code proposed to displace all common law privileges
with those set out in the model code. MODEL CODE EvID. R. 9.
65. MODEL CODE EVID. R. 220-23; 2 MANFRED S. GUT-MACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN, PSY-
CHIATRY AND THE LAW 269 (1952); see also Chaffee, supra note 63, at 616.
66. MODEL CODE EvID. R. 223(3).
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This exception was recognized in many jurisdictions that had already
enacted the privilege. 67 Tying the exception to the purported instru-
mental rationale of the privilege itself, Wigmore noted:
The whole reason for the privilege is the patient's supposed unwill-
ingness that the ailment should be disclosed to the world at large,
hence the bringing of a suit in which the very declaration and much
more the proof discloses the ailment to the world at large is of itself
an indication that the supposed repugnancy to disclosure does not
exist.6
8
By mid-century, commentators began discussing the need for a sep-
arate psychotherapist-patient privilege.69 There were two primary im-
petuses for the drive for a new privilege. First, the physician-patient
privilege, which could apply to psychiatry, was not uniformly estab-
lished throughout the country, notwithstanding its inclusion in the
Model Code. Thus, psychiatrists' ability to avoid testifying was tied to
the insecure fate of other medical doctors, as described above. 70 Sec-
ond, and more significantly, courts did not consistently apply the phy-
sician-patient privilege to communications arising in psychotherapy.
Even where a physician-patient privilege was recognized-as was the
case in approximately thirty states by 1960-questions occasionally
arose regarding whether treatment of "mental and emotional disor-
ders" was in fact "the practice of medicine," triggering the operation
of the privilege.71 Further, the field of clinical psychology grew expo-
nentially as psychologists began to provide treatment in private prac-
tice in the years following World War 11.72 That expansion raised the
question of whether to extend the physician-patient privilege to en-
compass non-physicians-such as licensed psychologists-or to distin-
guish the physician's privilege entirely and establish a new privilege
based, not upon the status of the person with whom the communica-
67. Present Status of Medical Privilege, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 762 (1933); MODEL CODE
EVID., supra note 64, at 29.
68. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2388, at 855, quoted in JEAN V. MCHALE, MEDICAL CONFI-
DENTIALITY AND LEGAL PRIVILEGE 111 (1993).
69. The question of whether there should be a psychotherapist-patient privilege is distinct
from issues regarding a psychotherapist's duty of confidentiality, which was already well estab-
lished in ethical rules and statutes by this time. See DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER,
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 11-24 (1987).
70. David Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part II: Confidential Communi-
cations, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731, 734 (1956). In fact, in New York, the new privilege was limited to
psychologists and followed the same scope as the state's attorney-client privilege. Id.
71. Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and
the Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 733, 735 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO
THE AGE OF PROZAC 293-95 (1997); Roderick D. Buchanan, Legislative Warriors: American
Psychiatrists, Psychologists, and Competing Claims Over Psychotherapy in the 1950s, 39 J. HIST.
BEHAV. SCI. 225, 228-46 (2003).
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tions occurred, but upon the context and nature of the communica-
tions themselves.
In the years that followed, two influential scholars called for the
widespread recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. In
1956, Professor David Louisell argued that a privilege should be ex-
tended to psychologists' communications with patients in the context
of providing "psychodiagnosis and psychotherapy. ' 73 Four years
later, Professor Ralph Slovenko authored a widely regarded law re-
view article on the subject urging the recognition of a privilege for
communications between psychiatrists and their patients. 74 He noted
that Wigmore had not considered the "psychotherapeutic relation-
ship" when he expressed his disapproval of evidentiary privileges and
that many of the criticisms leveled at the physician-patient privilege
did not apply to psychiatry.75 Referring primarily to psychoanalytic
treatment, including free association-which predominated the psy-
chotherapy field at that time-Slovenko noted that the psychothera-
peutic relationship "is unique and unlike any other that the patient or
anyone else is likely to encounter ... [as it] bear[s] little resemblance
to the usual social relationship. '76 He concluded: "A privilege for
those receiving psychotherapy is necessary if the psychiatric profes-
sion is to fulfill its medical responsibility to its patients. '77
In 1960, apparently buoyed by Professor Slovenko's arguments, the
field of psychiatry launched a full campaign for the enactment of the
psychiatrist-patient privilege. 78 The American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) issued a re-
port outlining its argument for recognition of the privilege. The
report set forth a classic instrumental rationale for the privilege:
"[T]here is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for
73. Louisell, supra note 70, at 744-45.
74. Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV.
175 (1960).
75. Id. at 185, 199.
76. Id. at 185. He also noted the "difference of language between the inner and outer world"
and that there is a "higher degree of accuracy in data" in the latter. Id. at 194. See also
SHORTER, supra note 72, at 146 (noting that by the mid-20th century, "[i]n the mind of the
public, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis became virtually synonymous"); SHUMAN & WEINER,
supra note 69, at 34 (noting that the basis for the instrumental or utilitarian rationale for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is rooted in the psychoanalytic model of psychotherapy and its
emphasis on "total disclosure by patient to therapist").
77. Slovenko, supra note 74, at 199. Interestingly, by 1974, Professor Slovenko had apparently
reversed course on the psychotherapist-patient privilege and concluded that, because the great
number of exceptions carved into the privilege "leav[es] little or no shield cover," the privilege
should be abolished. Ralph Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture
of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 649, 649, 673 (1974).
78. 25 WRIGrr & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5522, at 89.
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successful psychiatric treatment. '79 Thus, the psychiatrists argued, ab-
sent a guarantee that the words exchanged with their patients could
not become evidence in a courtroom, patients could not fully enjoy
the potential benefits of their treatment.8 0  The "model statute" pro-
posed in the GAP report followed essentially the same approach that
had been adopted with respect to psychologists in six states8 l in prior
years: to extend to communications between psychiatrists and pa-
tients the same privilege recognized for communications between at-
torneys and their clients.8 2 Where exceptions or waivers applied to
the attorney-client privilege, the same approach would be taken with
the psychiatrist-patient privilege.
The following year, Connecticut became the first state to consider
adopting the GAP proposal. A committee convened by the state
branch of the American Psychiatric Association offered the Connecti-
cut Legislature a bill that was more detailed and did not tie the scope
of the privilege to the attorney-client privilege.8 3 Thereafter, the Con-
necticut statute, rather than the GAP proposal, served as a model psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege.8 4 By the end of the decade, at least
four other states had enacted statutes based upon Connecticut's
statute.8 5
The Connecticut statute was the first psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege to expressly include a patient-litigant exception. The statute pro-
vided that there would be no privilege "in a civil proceeding in which
79. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 260 (1969) (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIA-
TRY, REPORT No. 45: CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE
OF PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960)).
80. See also ROBERT G. MEYER & CHRISTOPHER M. WEAVER, LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH:
A CASE-BASED APPROACH 70 (2006) ("Confidentiality forms the foundation upon which suc-
cessful mental health services stand.").
81. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, Tennessee, and Washington had enacted stat-
utes providing communications between a psychologist and client the same degree of protection
as those between an attorney and client. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 735 n.8.
82. Id. at 735. The language of the GAP's model statute read, in its entirety: "The confiden-
tial relationship and communication between the psychiatrist and patient shall be placed on the
same basis as regards privilege, as provided by law between attorney and client." Id. at 736.
83. Id. ("The GAP statute suggest[ed] a host of problems which call into question the appro-
priateness of the attorney-client model.").
84. Paul Frederic Slawson, Patient-Litigant Exception: A Hazard to Psychotherapy, 21
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 347, 349 (1969). Georgia had enacted a statute that provided
some level of protection to psychiatrists. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 735. It provided
simply: "There are certain admissions and communications excluded from consideration of pub-
lic policy. Among those are .. .[p]sychiatrists and patient." Id. at 735 n.7 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
85. Slawson, supra note 84, at 349 (Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, and Maryland). In 1967, Cali-
fornia enacted another influential psychotherapist-patient privilege statute as part of its new
evidence code. Id.
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the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim
or defense . . . [if] the judge finds that it is more important to the
interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than that the
relationship between patient and psychiatrist be protected. ' 86 While
this language was somewhat similar to that in the Model Code's physi-
cian-patient privilege, 87 the psychiatrists convinced the Connecticut
Legislature to include additional language enabling the trial court to
uphold the privilege even where the patient "introduce[d] his mental
condition as an element of his claim or defense. '88 Under the Con-
necticut law, it was the burden of the party seeking disclosure of the
confidential communications to demonstrate that the "interests of jus-
tice" outweighed the need to protect the psychotherapist-patient
relationship. 89
The inclusion of patient-litigant exceptions in the statutory psycho-
therapist-patient privileges did not generate much, if any, debate dur-
ing enactment of these early privileges. 90 However, in 1969, as states
rapidly enacted specific psychotherapist-patient privileges that con-
tained patient-litigant exceptions, one psychiatrist, Paul Frederic Slaw-
son, published a critique of the exception as applied to
communications arising in psychotherapy. 91 While initially the excep-
tion "seems reasonable and consonant with our sense of fair play," he
noted, "[o]n second look, the words of the patient-litigant exception
fall out of sharp focus."' 92 Slawson questioned the notion of a patient's
"mental or emotional condition" as being an easily ascertainable con-
struct.93 He also argued that what is revealed in psychotherapy notes
"is prone to distortion and consistently invitesmisunderstanding" and
therefore offers little "pertinent information. '94 He went so far as to
86. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 737. Although the Connecticut statute has undergone
significant revision since its enactment, the essential language of that exception remains in effect
to this date. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-146c(c)(2) (psychologists), 146f(5) (psychiatrists)
(West & West Supp. 2008). A few other state statutes set forth similar balancing language today.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/10(2) (West 2007) (exception applies only where a court deter-
mines that "disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection
from any injury which disclosure is likely to cause"); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(c)
(West 2000).
87. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
88. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 71, at 737.
89. Id.
90. Slawson, supra note 84, at 349.
91. Id. at 350-52. However, Slawson thought that such exception "makes sense" in the physi-
cian-patient context. Id.
92. Id. at 350.
93. Id. at 350-51. He was especially concerned about the abuse of the exception in divorce
proceedings. Id.
94. Id. at 351.
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assert that a psychiatric diagnosis "may be no more than the product
of a feeble inductive attempt made to satisfy administrative or actua-
rial needs. ' 95 "Lawyers," he reasoned, "want facts and psychiatrists
can do remarkably well without them. '96
Dr. Slawson's cautions apparently made no impact. By 1996, all
states had codified some kind of psychotherapist-patient privilege ei-
ther by statute or court rule,97 and each contained a patient-litigant
exception, either through a specific provision in the codification of the
rule or through a court ruling.98
95. Id. at 352.
96. Slawson, supra note 84, at 352.
97. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 n.l (1996) (citing statutes and rules for all 50 states and
the District of Columbia). The Uniform Rules of Evidence were amended in 1974 to be nearly
identical to the then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, including the rejected psychothera-
pist-patient privilege referenced infra at note 99. UNIF. R. EVID. 503 (1974), 13C U.L.A. 324-25
(2004); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.3. at 237, § 4.3.1, at 242-43. The Uniform Rules were
again amended in 1999. See UNIF. R. EVID. 503 (amended 1999), 13A U.L.A. 91-92 (2004). The
Uniform Rules created a single "Physician and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege" with the pro-
visions extending the privilege to all physicians in brackets. Id. The current version of the Uni-
form Rule sets forth a patient-litigant exception that is essentially identical to that in rejected
Rule 504, and provides that the privilege does not apply to any communication:
relevant to an issue of the [physical,] mental[,] or emotional condition of the patient in
any proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the
patient's claim or defense or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any
party relies upon the condition as an element of the party's claim or defense.
UNIF. R. EvID. 503(d)(3).
98. See BARBARA A. WEINER & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH
CARE 213 (1993); Daniel A. Cantu, Comment, When Should Federal Courts Require Psychother-
apists to Testify About Their Patients? An Interpretation of Jaffee v. Redmond, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 375, 383 n.73. There is significant variation among the states in terms of the scope and
operation of the patient-litigant exception. Some state statutes delineate in which kinds of pro-
ceedings the privilege may or may not operate. For example, some states have specific excep-
tions for child custody proceedings. Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs. of Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Rules of Evidence 503 (1997 draft), at 2. available at http:I/www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc.
htm/ulc/ure/ev503.pdf; see, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(e) (West 2000). A sub-
stantial number of statutes provide that the exception does not apply in workers compensation
cases. DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 7:23 (3d ed. 2005, updated
2007) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2380 n.6). Others place medical malpractice cases, by
contrast, squarely within the exception. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 9-
109(d)(4) (LexisNexis 2006). And at least one state, Michigan, frames its exception so that if a
party asserts the privilege during discovery, he is foreclosed from offering evidence at trial on his
condition. MICH. CT. R. 2.314(B)(2) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, if a party asserts that
the medical information is subject to a privilege and the assertion has the effect of preventing
discovery of medical information otherwise discoverable .. . the party may not thereafter present
... any.., evidence relating to the party's medical history or... condition."). Thus, rather than
finding a waiver of the privilege, the rule provides that invocation of the privilege operates to
limit the admissibility of evidence offered at trial by the plaintiff.
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B. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts
The development of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the
federal courts took a markedly different route from that in the states.
In contrast to the states' statutory privileges, federal privilege law con-
tinues to develop through the common law. Even after enacting the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, Congress left it to the courts to
determine which, if any, privileges would be recognized in all but strict
diversity jurisdiction cases, based upon judges' own "reason and expe-
rience." 99 The federal courts, however, continue to display a reluc-
tance to recognize privileges. Many heed the cautious language of the
Supreme Court's 1974 opinion, United States v. Nixon, in which the
Court rejected a broad view of presidential privilege, underscoring
that privileges "are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for
they are in derogation of the search for truth." 100 Until the Supreme
Court addressed this issue in 1996, federal courts considered the mer-
its and application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege on a case-
by-case basis and were sharply divided on whether to recognize the
privilege and on its appropriate contours. 10 1
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court addressed the psychother-
apist-patient privilege in a lethal force civil rights case brought by the
survivors of Ricky Allen, Sr. against Mary Lu Redmond, a police of-
99. FED. R. EviD. 501. Among the draft federal rules proposed by the Supreme Court were
several evidentiary privileges, including proposed Rule 504, a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-44 (1972). The
commentary noted that CAL. EyD. CODE §§ 1010-26 (West 2008) and CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
146a (1966 Supp.) served as two of the "illustrative statutes" consulted during the proposed
rule's drafting. Id. at 242. The drafters also concluded that the rationale for such privilege had
been convincingly stated in the GAP Proposal, supra note 79, as well as in Professor Slovenko's
article, supra note 74. Id. The proposed privilege included a patent-litigant exception typical of
that found in many state statutes. The inclusion of the proposed privileges proved extremely
controversial and Congress removed them from the final enactment. In their place, Congress
enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501 which provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of
Evidence on Privileges, One of the Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The
Strength of the Ingroup Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REV. 41 (2006).
100. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 710 (1974).
101. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996).
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ficer who shot and killed Allen when responding to a report of a
fight. 10 2 Plaintiffs' counsel learned during discovery that, after the
shooting, Redmond had participated in approximately fifty counseling
sessions with a social worker employed by the municipality.'0 3 The
plaintiffs' attorneys sought the records in discovery "for use in cross-
examining Redmond,"' 1 4 most likely because they hoped that such
records would contain valuable admissions about the incident such as
statements of guilt or remorse, or a description of the events at vari-
ance with others Redmond had provided. Redmond's attorneys and
counselor refused to produce the counseling records or to permit wit-
nesses to respond to questions regarding the counseling sessions, de-
spite court orders compelling disclosure. 10 5 As a sanction, the trial
court instructed the jury that they could make an adverse inference
about the content of the records since there was "no legal justifica-
tion" for the refusal to produce them.10 6 The court entered judgment
for plaintiffs on the jury's verdict of $545,000.107
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 108 The
panel concluded that Evidence Rule 501's "reason and experience"
standard led to the conclusion that the federal common law should
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.' 0 9 However, in lan-
guage echoing the standard first seen in the 1960 Connecticut stat-
ute,1" 0 the panel also noted that the privilege would not apply where
"in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of
the contents of a patient's counseling sessions outweighs the patient's
privacy interests." '' The court concluded that the privilege should be
recognized in that case based upon the minimal probative value of the
therapy records as compared with Redmond's substantial privacy in-
terests." 2 Noting that the circuit courts were divided on the issue of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege (two had recognized the privi-
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 6.
108. Jaffee v. Redmond. 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
109. Id. at 1355-56.
110. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146 (1966 Supp.); see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
111. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357.
112. Id. at 1358.
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lege," l3 while four rejected it t 14), the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and affirmed."15
In recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court re-
lied almost exclusively on an instrumental rationale. Justice Stevens
noted that the privilege is "'rooted in the imperative need for confi-
dence and trust,"' 1 t6 since "effective psychotherapy" requires a pa-
tient to be "willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts,
emotions, memories, and fears.' ' 117 The psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege would also "serve public ends," 118 because the "mental health of
our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of tran-
scendent importance."'" 9 The majority contrasted these benefits with
the merely "modest" evidentiary benefit if there were no privilege.
"Without a privilege," the Court reasoned, "much of the desirable evi-
dence to which litigants ... seek access ... is unlikely to come into
being."' 20 The majority also gave great weight to the fact that, by this
point in time, "all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted
into law some form of psychotherapist privilege."'12'
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Seventh
Circuit, it tinkered with the lower court's conceptualization of the
privilege. Specifically, it rejected the "balancing" approach employed
by the panel and instead recognized the privilege as absolute. 122 The
Court incorporated and applied the reasoning first articulated in
Upjohn Co. v. United States 23:
[I]f the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in
the confidential conversation "must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.
An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but re-
113. In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
114. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 863 (1994);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United
States, 493 U.S. 906 (1989); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1084 (1989); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 853 (1976).
115. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1. 7, 18 (1996).
116. Id. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)) (discussing the attor-
ney-client privilege).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 12.
121. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12.
122. Id. at 17-18.
123. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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suits in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all." 124
The Court did not suggest what circumstances would give rise to a
waiver of the privilege; it simply acknowledged in a footnote: "Like
other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the pro-
tection. ' 125 In a separate footnote, the Court also acknowledged that
there could be occasions where the privilege would need to "give
way," such as "if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others
can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist. ' 126
Commentators have noted that Jaffee appears to be an aberration
when compared with the general hostility of the federal courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, to the recognition of privileges.127 Professor
Imwinkelried reasons that the "extraordinary fact pattern[,]a highly
plausible instrumental argument ... [and] unanimous support for the
privilege among the states" led to the result in Jaffee.128 However,
the decision did not silence the critics of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, and Justice Scalia's dissent reflects many of their criti-
cisms. 129 Notably, contemporary commentators and researchers con-
tinue to question the instrumental rationale upon which the privilege
is based. 130 Nonetheless, the holding of Jaffee established a psycho-
124. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
125. Id. at 15 n.14.
126. Id. at 18 n.19.
127. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 4.2.4, at 229.
128. Id. at 231.
129. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (taking aim at the instrumental rationale,
among other things).
130. For a discussion of the various rationales offered and questioned with respect to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, see generally SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 39. 25-43
("There is substantial disagreement about the extent of confidentiality required for effective
therapy . . . . The question of the relationship between patients' complete openness and the
quality of their treatment has yet to be established."). The authors conducted a series of empiri-
cal studies to test the instrumental rationale and concluded that, "while confidentiality is impor-
tant in therapeutic relationships, privilege is not." Id. at 113. They also noted, however, that
"[tihe deontological argument for a psychotherapist-patient privilege, frequently ignored by the
privilege's proponents in common law jurisdictions, is persuasive both on its own terms and as a
vehicle for avoiding the quagmire created by the assumptions underlying the utilitarian argu-
ments." Id. at 135.
For an excellent analysis and critique of the Court's application of the instrumental rationale
in Jaffee, see Edward J. Imwinkelried. The Rivalry between Truth and Privilege: The Weakness of
the Supreme Court's Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 49 HAs-
TINGs L.J. 969 (1998). See also IMwINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.2.7, at 503-08; Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the
Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 145 (2004); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psy-
chological Critique of the Assumptions Underlying the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights
from the Literature on Self-Disclosure, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 707 (2004). Professor Imwinkelried
notes that the purported empirical support for the rationale does not hold up under scrutiny.
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.2.7, at 507. He suggests a preferable rationale he refers to as
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therapist-patient privilege that was to be recognized and enforced in
the context of litigation, without regard to the principles with which
courts generally concern themselves during discovery disputes such as
relevance, necessity, and fairness to the party seeking discovery of
privileged communications.' 3' However, in the years since the opin-
ion, the Supreme Court's absolute privilege has emerged as one that is
truly "uncertain" 132 and ultimately illusory.
IV. IMPLIED WAIVER OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
While Jaffee answered the basic questions that had previously di-
vided federal courts-whether there should be a federal psychothera-
pist-patient privilege, to which professions should it apply, and
whether the privilege should be absolute-the most common question
in federal courts regarding the enforcement of the privilege did not
arise in that case. Namely, under what circumstances should a court
decline to enforce the privilege where doing so would limit a defen-
dant's ability to access records and testimony that may be relevant to
a plaintiff's claim? The federal courts have generally framed the issue
as whether a plaintiff's allegations and claims have resulted in an im-
plied "waiver" of the psychotherapist-patient privilege such that the
psychotherapy records are subject to discovery. However, the case
law on this issue generates more questions than answers.
A. A Problem of Terminology: "Waiver" Versus "Exception"
When considering the approaches to waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege in federal courts, courts and codifiers are inexact and
inconsistent with their terminology. What developed in the state leg-
islatures as the "patient-litigant exception" to the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege-where the patient has somehow injected his or her
mental condition into litigation she may not simultaneously assert the
psychotherapist-patient privilege to limit discovery of any records of
such mental condition-emerged in the federal courts in the terminol-
ogy of the "in issue," or "at issue" waiver of the privilege. 133 In both
the "humanistic rationale," which is based upon core democratic principles of privacy and auton-
omy. Id. at 509. While some existing privileges do not pass muster under that rationale, Profes-
sor Imwinkelried concludes that the psychotherapist-patient privilege would serve such
principles. Id. at 509-12.
131. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18.
132. Id. at 18.
133. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 873-85. The notion of an issue-driven waiver
is not unique to the psychotherapist-patient privilege but can arise in the context of the attorney-
client privilege and the physician-patient privilege, among others. Id.
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contexts, the privilege holder is unable to resist discovery requests for
mental health information, but quite different terms are used to de-
scribe the mechanism that brings about such result.' 34
Commentators analyzing the general concept of "waiver" consist-
ently emphasize the central roles of intentionality and voluntariness as
indispensible preconditions for a finding of waiver.135 Professor Jes-
sica Wilen Berg noted that the requirement of "intention" contains
the corresponding requirement that "the actor must understand the
act and its consequences. ' 136 Similarly, Professor Edward Rubin ob-
served that the most "general" definition of waiver is "a decision not
to exercise a right, or, more precisely, a judicial finding that a person
has lost a right as a result of his decision."'137 Rubin argued that, since
one could argue that someone waived his right to liberty by commit-
ting a crime, to effectuate a waiver the decision must be "directly re-
lated to the right in question."'138 Thus, each of these formulations
looks to an affirmative act by an individual holding a legal right to
determine if the individual has waived her right. Indeed, this frame-
work calls into question the very notion of an "implied" waiver and
suggests that the concept should be applied with caution. 139
In American law, a testimonial privilege is a legal right that, once
held, can be waived, and the general terminology and conceptualiza-
tion of waiver, therefore, apply as they would to other rights that a
person may waive. 140 Generally, waiver of a privilege is a failure to
assert the privilege at a juncture where one would be expected to do
so, such as through voluntary disclosure, or a failure to object to dis-
closure in other phases of litigation. 41 The law recognizes both im-
plied and actual waivers of privileges by a wide range of actions,
134. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543, at n.39.
135. See Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 Hous. L. REV. 281, 306-07 (2003)
(describing these requirements as: "voluntariness (freedom from controlling interference) and
intention to act (which includes knowledge and capacity)"); Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General
Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478, 480-83 (1981).
136. Berg, supra note 135, at 314.
137. Rubin, supra note 135, at 483. Rubin disputed that intention and knowledge are merely
"criteria by which the quality of a particular decision can be judged." Id.
138. Id. at 484.
139. Similarly. Slawson, in arguing the privilege should only be set aside where there is a
waiver by the patient, noted that the concept of waiver "implies full knowledge and understand-
ing of what is being waived" and "awareness of the consequences of [such] disclosure." Slawson.
supra note 84, at 351. He suspected that patients in fact have little understanding of what is in
their psychiatrists' notes and charts. Id.
140. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1. at 842.
141. See, e.g., 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 5:11 (3d ed. 2007).
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including by execution of releases of information, 142 by contract,'143
and by disclosure to third parties.144 The assumption is that any such
act is "an autonomous choice by the holder" of the privilege. 145 This
approach is reflected in the specific section on waiver set forth in re-
jected Federal Rule of Evidence 511 and similar provisions in the uni-
form and model rules under which "waiver" occurs only through
voluntary disclosure or consent to others' disclosure of the privileged
communication.146
The term "exception" as applied to privileges, such as the "danger-
ous patient" or "crime fraud" exceptions to the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege, generally limits the privilege based upon the content of
the communication, such as a threat to do harm to others. 147  In these
instances, the privilege is regarded as never attaching to the communi-
cation. By contrast, the concept of waiver is more appropriately con-
sidered after the fact of the confidential communication, once the
privilege and the accompanying rights of enforcement have at-
tached. 48 Thus, a patient may enjoy the privilege for an extended
142. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1, at 853.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 859.
145. Id. at 843; see also id. § 6.12.4, at 877 (noting that filing a pleading containing an allega-
tion concerning the substance of confidential communications is "an affirmative act placing the
issue[s] in dispute" which may trigger the "at issue" waiver doctrine of privileges).
146. For example, the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides, in the section titled "Waiver of
Privilege":
(a) Voluntary disclosure. A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against
disclosure waives the privilege if the person or the person's predecessor, while holder
of the privilege, voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of
the privileged matter. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged.
(b) Involuntary disclosure. A claim of privilege is not waived by a disclosure that was
compelled erroneously or made without an opportunity to claim the privilege.
UNIF. RULES EviD. 510, 13A U.L.A. 100 (2004); see also Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 258-59 (1972) (setting forth text of Proposed Rule 511,
upon which Uniform Rule 511(a) is based).
147. Some federal courts and several state evidence rules recognize a so-called "crime-fraud"
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory
P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1999). Courts are divided on the so-called "dangerous
patient" exception. Compare United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that there may be an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege where disclosure is
the only means to avoid harm), with United States v. Chase. 340 F.3d 978 991-92 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (holding that there is no dangerous patient exception), and United States v. Hayes,
227 F.3d 578, 586-87 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that there is no dangerous patient exception in
criminal cases). See also Orenstein, supra note 17, at 687 (questioning why the courts struggling
with the dangerous patient exception did not consider whether the communications would fall
under the crime-fraud exception).
148. Cf. Comment, supra note 62, at 530-31 (noting that the physician-patient privilege "con-
fers a power on the patient" which can be either exercised or waived only by the patient
himself).
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period of time-even decades-before some subsequent action by the
patient, such as executing a release, vitiates the privilege.149 This dis-
tinction appears in Jaffee, where Justice Stevens notes, "[l]ike other
testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the protec-
tion, ' 1 50 and "we do not doubt that there are situations in which the
privilege must give way.'1 5 1 Thus, in a case in which the privilege at
issue is framed in broad terms, the Court itself appears to be making a
distinction between "waiver," which is premised on actions by the pa-
tient, and exceptions to the privilege itself which turn on the
"situation." 152
This variation in terminology with respect to the same mechanism is
significant because it may serve as one explanation of federal courts'
failure to approach the question as one truly concerning a "waiver," as
that general concept is understood and applied in the law.' 53 As
noted above, the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the states is
largely a creature of statute or rule. Following the Model Code, the
revised Uniform Rules of Evidence, and the early Connecticut and
California statutes, a significant number of states include a "patient-
litigant exception" in the privilege's codification.1 54 In the federal
courts, the term "patient-litigant exception" is essentially absent from
the federal common law of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
However, the same reasoning underlying the exception in state courts
is now seen in the analysis of implied waiver in federal courts, as dis-
cussed below. 155
The underlying principles of waiver, in whatever context, require
courts, when determining whether there has been a waiver, to focus
exclusively on the knowledge, decisions, and actions of the holder of
the right allegedly waived. Considerations such as the potential bene-
149. Professor Slovenko suggested that the distinction should be between waiver and "termi-
nation" of the privilege and that the latter is a more accurate description of the operation of
filing suit in which a patient's mental or emotional condition is at issue and that "the term
'waiver' ought to apply only in the situation where the patient voluntarily gives up his privilege
and requires the physician to testify." RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY,
AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 155 (1966).
150. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1. 15 n.14 (1996) (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 18 n.19 (emphasis added).
152. See also SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 7 (drawing a distinction between whether
the privilege is "waived by the patient" and exceptions to the privilege). Thus, the state law
"patient-litigant exception" could be considered a misnomer.
153. See 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543 n.44 (noting that applying the concept
of "waiver" to the patient-litigant exception "distort[s] the waiver doctrine").
154. See Cantu, supra note 98, at 383 n.73 (referring to specific statutes or court rules, rather
than limitations emerging from court decisions, "[t]wenty-nine states provide no privilege for
information raised as evidence for a claim or defense").
155. See infra notes 156-324 and accompanying text.
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fits flowing to others if the right is not enforced, while useful and im-
portant when determining a privilege's exceptions and limitations at
the time of its initial construction, have no place in the analysis of
waiver. However, as the review of the case law below reveals, the
general principles that apply to the questions of waiver of rights are
largely absent from the analysis of waiver of the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege in federal courts. The decisions too infrequently con-
sider the plaintiff's actions and choices in direct relation to the right
allegedly waived. Indeed, most federal courts are not in fact treating
the issue of the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as a
question of waiver at all.
B. The Federal Courts' Approach to Waiver
The case law concerning waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege revolves around a basic question with a very complex answer:
What does it mean to place one's "mental condition" in issue such that
it effectuates a waiver of the privilege? In Jaffee, the Court addressed
the existence of the privilege in one of the very rare cases in which a
court considered the privilege without also grappling with the concept
of waiver, because it was a defendant asserting the privilege in that
case.1 56 After previously denying certiorari in at least five cases where
the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege was squarely at
issue, the Supreme Court finally weighed in on the privilege question
in a case with no waiver issue. 157 Since Jaffee, the Supreme Court has
been squarely presented with the issue of the appropriate approach to
questions arising under the "at issue" waiver, but has declined, as re-
cently as 2007, to grant certiorari on such issue.158 Indeed, as was the
case with the privilege itself prior to Jaffee, courts are left stumbling
along, trying to fashion a rule on a case-by-case basis. 159
156. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5-6.
157. Id. at 7.
158. In Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 127 S. Ct. 1815 (2007), the Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari in an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Doe v.
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006), discussed infra at note 183 and accompanying text.
Plaintiff-appellant phrased the question presented for review as follows:
Under what circumstances does a Plaintiff in a Title VII case, who seeks compensatory
damages under Title VII for emotional distress, waive the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege that this Court recognized in Jaffee? Guidance is needed to resolve the split in the
circuit courts and in the more than sixty district courts that have reported their
decisions.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Doe, 127 S. Ct. 1815 (No. 06-735).
159. One should always be cautious when drawing generalizations about what happens in liti-
gation, including discovery, based upon written opinions that find their way into official report-
ers or electronic databases. Given the state of the case law, or ignorance of it, plaintiffs' counsel
may not challenge defense attorneys' attempts to obtain counseling records, or to take the depo-
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1. "Broad" Versus "Narrow" Approaches to Waiver
Nearly all of the discussion and analysis of waiver of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege divide the judicial approaches into two
camps: broad and narrow. 60 Courts that take a broad approach to
waiver are less scrutinous of a defendant's assertion that there has
been a waiver and are more likely to order disclosure of psychother-
apy records. 161 By contrast, those taking the narrow, minority ap-
proach 162 are more likely to deny disclosure by finding that a
plaintiff's actions in the litigation fell short of that required to effectu-
ate a waiver.1 63 However, the procedural posture of the cases, the
rationales applied by the courts, and other factors reveal that the case
law cannot be analyzed and critiqued using this simple dichotomy. 164
The "broad approach" label generally applies to cases in which
courts find a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege based
solely upon a plaintiff's assertion of a nonspecific claim for emotional
distress, though the plaintiff has not offered the testimony of an ex-
pert psychological witness to support her claim.165 Courts adopting a
more narrow approach will usually decline to find a waiver unless the
plaintiff has listed her psychotherapist as a witness for trial or other-
wise proposed to place the privileged communications directly or indi-
rectly in issue. 166
sition of a current or former treating psychotherapist. If there is a discovery dispute, it is likely
that it would not result in a reported decision, but rather would be resolved through a telephonic
conference with a federal magistrate judge. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3). Thus, one can assume
that in a significant number of federal civil rights actions in which the plaintiff's psychiatric his-
tory is sought, any controversy regarding discovery of mental health treatment is unknown to
those outside of the proceedings. Cf. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimi-
nation, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927. 927 (2006) (noting that the prevalence of confidential settlements in
workplace discrimination claims "skews empirical studies of discrimination litigation"). None-
theless, there are a sufficient number of written decisions addressing implied waiver of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege to provide a good indication of how the question is generally
framed and addressed in the courts.
160. See generally Aronson, supra note 10, at 605-07; McDonnell, supra note 10, at 1370.
161. See, e.g., Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
162. See, e.g., Cohen v. City of New York. No. 05-CV-6780, 2007 WL 2789272, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007).
163. See, e.g., Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526 529 (N.D. I11. 1999).
164. See Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch. Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 556 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("This Court
... has found that, upon close inspection, many of the cases purporting to reject the narrow view
and adopt a broad view actually take a middle ground.").
165. See, e.g., Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw. 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v.
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006); Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:06-CV-211, 2007
WL 3333394, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007): EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., No.
8:03CV165, 2007 WL 649298, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2007): Manessis v. New York City Dep't of
Transp., No. 02 CIV. 359SASDF. 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002).
166. See, e.g., Barnett v. PA Consulting Group Inc., No. 04-1245, 2007 WL 845886, at *4
(D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007); Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIVl145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *9
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The leading case under the narrow approach is Vanderbilt v. Town
of Chilmark,167 decided the year after Jaffee. Drawing on case law
analyzing alleged waivers of attorney-client privilege, the Vanderbilt
court reasoned that a waiver results not from the plaintiff raising an
issue arguably related to her mental health, but rather from offering
communications with a mental health care provider as evidence in the
litigation.' 68 Thus, absent notice that the plaintiff intended to call her
therapist as a witness who would then reveal privileged communica-
tions, there could be no waiver.1 69 Some courts have followed this
rationale and concluded that, where the plaintiff has not listed her
therapist as a potential expert, there has been no waiver of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege. 170 Similarly, in cases where a plaintiff
has listed her treating psychotherapist as a witness, defendants gener-
ally prevail in their assertions that there has been a waiver of the
privilege. 17
The approach to waiver taken in Vanderbilt and by courts that fol-
low the opinion is generally consistent with the essential principles of
waiver. The court focused its analysis on whether the privilege-
holder, the plaintiff, had undertaken an act directly related to the priv-
ileged communications (i.e. offering the communications in support of
her claims) that was plainly inconsistent with an assertion of the privi-
lege such that it can be properly regarded as a waiver of the privilege.
Considerations such as the impact on the parties' positions, the rele-
vance of the information, and notions of fairness play little, if any role,
in these courts' determination of whether there has been a waiver.172
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006); Greenberg v. Smolka, No. 03 Civ. 8572, 2006 WL 1116521, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006); Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639-40 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Allen v.
Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 97 C 3625, 1999 WL 168466, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1999).
167. Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
168. Id. at 228-29; see also Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 529 (drawing similar analogy to waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and concluded that there was no waiver because the plaintiff did not
plan to offer evidence of "prior consultations with psychotherapists in order to prove his claim of
emotional harm").
169. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229.
170. See Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088, 2006 WL 2711534 (E.D.
Ark. Sept. 21 2006); Kunstler, 2006 WL 2516625, at *9; Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 639; cf. United
States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d. 1187, 1190 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that the defendant was not
entitled to discover the victim's counseling records when victim did not intend to discuss the
"content of her counseling sessions" at the sentencing hearing).
171. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 365 (D. Colo. 2004); Adams v. Ardcor,
196 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Wisc. 2000); Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Springfield,
Inc., 967 F. Supp. 346, 350 (C.D. II. 1997).
172. See, e.g., Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D.
Me. Aug. 21, 2001) ("[T]he proper subject for the waiver analysis is whether the substance of a
particular communication has been placed in issue, not whether the topic of communication is
relevant to the factual issues of the case.").
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However, the majority of courts that have considered the question
of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege have taken a very
different course. 173 Doe v. City of Chula Vista provides an example of
the reasoning employed by courts taking a broader view of waiver in
the context of emotional distress claims. 174 The opinion is remarka-
ble in two respects: first, it contains a lengthy analysis of the relative
merits of the narrow-versus-broad approaches, and second, it reverses
a magistrate's decision that provided an even lengthier analysis lead-
ing to precisely the opposite conclusion on the same facts.175 A for-
mer assistant city attorney filed a claim for discrimination on the basis
of perceived disability, alleging that her employer terminated her after
she refused to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. 176 Pointing to the
plaintiff's claim for emotional distress damages, the defendants sought
documents of "each and every mental and psychological disorder" for
which the plaintiff had sought treatment in the previous ten years.177
The discovery dispute was presented to the magistrate judge who, af-
ter reviewing the case law, found the "narrow view" to be more per-
suasive.' 78 Nonetheless, the magistrate ordered the disclosure of the
names of healthcare providers who treated the plaintiff within the pre-
vious year and permitted the defendants to inquire into other "events
and circumstances" in the plaintiff's life to determine if there were any
other potential causes of emotional distress.' 79
In response to the defendants' objection to the magistrate judge's
ruling, the district court significantly broadened the information to
which the defendants could have access. The judge first reviewed the
rationales and approaches of the two competing lines of cases regard-
ing waiver and concluded that the United States Supreme Court
would adopt the broad view of waiver. 180 Since the plaintiff there
sought emotional distress damages, the court concluded, her "emo-
tional health, near the time of the defendants' alleged misconduct, is
173. Cuoco v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98 Civ. 9009, 2003 WL 1618530, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2003).
174. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The issue arose in an ADA
case, but because the plaintiff asserted a claim only under the "regarded as" prong of the defini-
tion of disability, and did not allege an actual disability, the ADA claim did not come into play in
the waiver question.
175. Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
176. Doe, 196 F.R.D. at 562.
177. Id. at 563.
178. Fritsch, 187 F.R.D. at 629-30.
179. Id. at 633.
180. Doe, 196 F.R.D. at 568. The court based this conclusion, in part, on the "Court's" (albeit
through an advisory committee and twenty-five years earlier) inclusion of a patient-litigant ex-
ception in the psychotherapist-patient privilege ultimately rejected by Congress. Id.
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an issue in the litigation" and she "is relying on her emotional state to
make her case.' 181 Accordingly, the plaintiff could not shield her psy-
chotherapy records from discovery.
Several other courts have followed the same basic reasoning of Doe
v. City of Chula Vista, but few have provided an in-depth discussion of
the issue. 182 Three federal courts of appeals follow the broad ap-
proach, but none has offered close analysis of the controversy in the
lower courts. In Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, writing on behalf of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner noted
simply, "If a plaintiff by seeking damages for emotional distress places
his or her psychological state in issue, the defendant is entitled to dis-
cover any records of that state.' 83 Similarly, in Schoffstall v. Hender-
son, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff
had "place[d] ... her medical condition at issue" by seeking emotional
distress damages and therefore had waived the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. 184 Finally, in Maday v. Public Libraries of Saginaw, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reasoned that by seeking emo-
tional distress damages, the plaintiff had "put her emotional state at
issue in the case" and therefore waived any psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 185
More recently, two federal appeals courts have indicated that they
would follow a different approach. 186 However, neither court was re-
quired to address squarely the issue of whether a claim for emotional
distress is a basis for finding a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. In Koch v. Cox, an employment discrimination case in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the plaintiff
chose to withdraw his claim for emotional distress. 187 In reversing the
district court's finding that the plaintiff had nonetheless waived the
privilege by acknowledging in discovery responses that he had been
diagnosed with depression, the panel indicated that it found Vander-
bilt's reasoning more persuasive than the Oberweis Dairy and Schoff-
181. Id. at 569.
182. See, e.g., Waggaman v. Villanova Univ., No. 04-4447, 2006 WL 2045486, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
July 14, 2006); Manessis v. New York City Dep't of Transp., No. 02 CIV. 359, 2002 WL 31115032,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002); Metzger v. Francis W. Parker Sch., No. 00 C 5200, 2001 WL
910443, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2001); Calder v. TCI Cablevision of Mo., Inc., No. 4:99-CV-
01005, 2001 WL 991459, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2001); Sidor v. Reno, No. 95 Civ. 9588, 1998
WL 164823, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998).
183. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 1815
(2007).
184. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000).
185. Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007).
186. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008); Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
187. Koch, 489 F.3d at 388.
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stall decisions, particularly with respect to the Vanderbilt court's
analogy to the attorney-client privilege.' 88 The panel noted that, were
it to follow the broad view of waiver adopted by the district court, it
would "sub silentio . . . overrule" Jaffee, without the authority to do
so.18 9 The court reasoned that it must "supply a standard for deter-
mining whether a patient has waived the privilege ... that does not
eviscerate the privilege."' 90 Accordingly, the court concluded that a
plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege only when he has
"bas[ed] his claim upon the psychotherapist's communications with
him" or "'selectively disclos[ed] part of a privileged communication in
order to gain an advantage in litigation."19t
Similarly, in In re Sims the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
granted the plaintiff's request for a writ of mandamus after concluding
that the trial court in that excessive force case had abused its discre-
tion when it ordered the disclosure of the plaintiff's psychiatric
records.' 92 The plaintiff had expressly and unambiguously withdrawn
his claims for emotional distress damages, and the issue of the plain-
tiff's psychiatric history arose only in response to defense counsel's
questions during the plaintiff's deposition. 193 The appeals court found
the reasoning in Koch to be persuasive and, in reversing the district
court's order, emphasized the "transcendent importance of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege."'1 94
188. Id. at 391. The panel also implicitly rejected the holding in a prior employment discrimi-
nation case, Kalinoski v. Evans, 377 F. Supp. 2d 136, 138 (D.D.C. 2005), which found a waiver
based solely upon a claim that the plaintiff suffered extreme emotional distress requiring treat-
ment with a psychotherapist. Koch, 489 F.3d at 387. The district court itself issued an opinion
distinguishing Kalinoski and taking a fairly narrow approach a week after Koch was argued but
before it was decided. Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., No. 04-1245, 2007 WL 845886, at
*4 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007).
189. Koch, 489 F.3d at 390.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting S.E.C. v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (construing the marital
privilege). By rejecting the defendant's arguments that the plaintiff's discovery responses trig-
gered a waiver of the privilege, the Koch court implicitly recognized that a response under the
compulsion of the broad discovery rules does not satisfy the voluntariness requirement of a
waiver. See also Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634, 637 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that there was no waiver of patient-physician privilege by revealing communications in response
to deposition questioning by opposing counsel); Kromenacker v. Blystone, 539 N.E.2d 675, 678
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
192. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 141 (2d Cir. 2008).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 134.
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2. "Garden-Variety Emotional Distress" Versus Specific Psychiatric
Injury
Several courts have adopted the category of "garden-variety emo-
tional distress" as a means to differentiate cases where there has not
been an implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.195
This distinction was apparently first coined in a discovery ruling in
Sabree v. United Brothers of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local
No. 33, a pre-Jaffee race discrimination case.' 96 A magistrate judge
initially determined that the court should recognize a psychotherapist-
patient privilege.' 97 In concluding that there was no applicable "ex-
ception" to the psychotherapist-patient privilege present, she noted:
"Sabree has not placed his mental condition at issue. Sabree makes a
'garden-variety' claim of emotional distress, not a claim of psychic in-
jury or psychiatric disorder resulting from the alleged discrimina-
tion."' 98 The courts that have employed this distinction will decline to
order disclosure of psychotherapy records if a plaintiff asserts a claim
for emotional distress without alleging a specific diagnosable mental
condition as a component of compensatory damages or without offer-
ing the testimony of an expert witness to prove emotional distress. 199
"Garden-variety emotional distress" is a legal term, not a psychiat-
ric term,200 and it is not a particularly useful construct. 201 One com-
mentator refers to it as a "vegetarian metaphor" used to distinguish
"meatier" claims of emotional distress.20 2  A few courts have at-
195. See Gott, supra note 10, at 97-100; Mara Kent & Thomas Kent, Michigan Civil Rights
Claimants: Should They Be Required to Give Up Their Physician-Patient Privilege When Alleg-
ing Garden-Variety Emotional Distress?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 480 (2000).
196. Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D. 422, 426
(D. Mass. 1989). One commentator has referred to the decision as "landmark." Sherry L. Rus-
chioni, Confidentiality of Mental Health Records in Federal Courts: The Path Blazed by Sabree v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local No. 33, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV.
923, 924 (2004).
197. Sabree, 126 F.R.D. at 426. The magistrate judge appears to have reached this conclusion
in part due to the sensitive nature and marginal relevance to the proceedings of the plaintiff's
psychotherapy records, which she had reviewed in camera. Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088, 2006 WL 2711534, at
*5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006) (referring to those courts employing the garden-variety distinction
as taking the "middle approach"); EEOC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224-25 (N.D. Cal.
2006); Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 450 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
200. Saul Rosenberg & Mark Levy, Unwarranted Restrictions on the Independent Examination
of Emotional Damages, DEF. COMMENT, Spring 2004, at 11-12 (critiquing development of the
term "garden-variety" in the context of compelled mental examinations as a "scientifically
meaningless concept").
201. See RANDOM HOUSE DICTrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 2006), which
defines garden-variety as "common, usual, or ordinary; unexceptional."
202. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5543 n.94.2.
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tempted to define "garden-variety" emotional distress, while others
simply employ the term to describe a plaintiff's claims. 20 3  Many
courts employing such terminology place great weight on the presence
of a psychiatric diagnosis. 20 4 But a diagnosis reveals little in terms of
the severity of emotional damages. While a plaintiff may indicate in
response to discovery queries that she has been diagnosed with a par-
ticular mental disorder, it does not necessarily follow that she will of-
fer evidence of such diagnosis to support her claim for damages. 20 5
Further, it is highly unusual for an individual receiving psychother-
apy of some kind to not be diagnosed with a condition found in the
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders.20 6 Insurance companies and publicly funded
health care programs invariably require a clinical diagnosis in order to
approve coverage for psychotherapy, 20 7 and there are several diagno-
ses appropriate for temporary or mild conditions. 208 Accordingly, a
plaintiff's diagnosis with a mental disorder is not a sound basis for
203. See, e.g., Santos v. Boeing Co., No. 02-C-9310, 2003 WL 23162439, at *2 (N.D. Il. Oct. 21,
2003) (denying defendant's motion to compel discovery of plaintiff's mental health records).
204. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 557 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (col-
lecting cases).
205. If she does offer the diagnosis as evidence, most courts would likely require her to do so
through expert medical testimony, in which case there might be a waiver as a result of offering
such evidence. See, e.g., 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 551 (1996). The practice guide explains:
While a nonexpert or lay witness may not give expert testimony as to his physical con-
dition, he may state simple inferences drawn from his conscious subjective sensations
concerning such condition .... According to some authority, a witness should be con-
fined to testimony or statements relating to the outward appearance of his injuries and
to the symptoms experienced by him, such as pain, suffering, and the like, and should
not be permitted to testify as to the nature of his injuries, the applicable medical termi-
nology, and the like, and the medical prognosis or treatment. According to some cases,
a witness may not testify as to whether or not he had a particular disease or was treated
for a particular disease.
Id.
206. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS (4th ed. text rev. 2000).
207. See id. at 1 (noting that the United States Health Care Finance Administration mandates
use of the DSM's codes "for purposes of reimbursement" and that many private insurers require
use of the codes as well). While not every person receiving psychotherapy is covered by insur-
ance or a publicly funded program, it is likely to be a substantial percentage that, at one point or
another in treatment, has some degree of coverage, thus triggering the diagnosis requirement.
208. See, e.g., id. at 683 ("Adjustment Disorders" are a group of conditions marked by "the
development of emotional or behavioral symptoms in response to an identifiable stressor(s) oc-
curring within three months of the onset of the stressor(s)"); id. at 604 ("Primary Insomnia" is a
disorder primarily characterized by a "difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep, or nonrestorative
sleep, for at least 1 month.").
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determining whether there is a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 20 9
Similarly, some courts distinguish garden-variety emotional distress
from other emotional distress based upon whether the plaintiff has
sought psychotherapy for the condition. As one magistrate judge ex-
plained with respect to his understanding of non-garden-variety emo-
tional distress, "Generally what we find in these cases is someone
sought psychotherapy. '21 0 Under this circular reasoning, a person
who has psychotherapy records, and therefore something to protect
with the psychotherapist-patient privilege, does not by definition have
garden-variety emotional distress. Of course, there are several rea-
sons why one does or does not seek therapy, which may have little to
do with the severity of the emotional distress.2t1 Indeed, once litiga-
tion is inevitable, a plaintiff may decide to discontinue psychotherapy
for the very reason that her records would be subject to discovery,
only to find that the defendant can successfully argue that the alleged
emotional distress was minimal as demonstrated by the plaintiff's fail-
ure to seek treatment.21 2
3. Applying Privacy, Fairness, and Relevance Rationales to Waiver
Questions
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court took to task the balancing approach
followed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had established
only a conditional privilege, meaning that the application of the privi-
lege would consider the defendant's need for the evidence. 213 This
conceptualization is similar to that seen in the Connecticut statute
which requires courts to weigh the "interests of justice" implicated by
disclosure of privileged communications. 21 4 Instead, the Supreme
Court established the psychotherapist-patient privilege as an "abso-
lute" privilege, which means that the opposing party's need for the
evidence would not bear on whether a court would enforce the privi-
lege. The absolute approach is not as inflexible as the name would
209. Edward Imwinkelried proposed a waiver distinction based upon whether the plaintiff is
merely asserting "transitory feelings ...or sensations," rather than a true "condition." IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 882-83.
210. Orenstein, supra note 17, at 699. Magistrate Judge Orenstein went on to say that he
thought that the garden-variety distinction in mental health cases, as opposed to general medical
cases, was created to provide an additional layer of privacy for plaintiffs. Id. at 702.
211. One study by the American Psychiatric Association suggested that the overwhelming
majority of individuals who experience anxiety and depression never seek treatment. Robinson,
supra note 37, at 70.
212. Id. at 68.
213. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1. 7 (1996).
214. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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imply; the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the possibility of
waiver and exceptions. Nonetheless, the stated effect of creating an
absolute privilege is to wholly eliminate from the analysis any consid-
eration of competing interests of fairness, relevance, and truth-seek-
ing. However, while no trial or appeals court of course admits to a
rejection of the absolute approach set forth in Jaffee, such balancing in
fact pervades the post-Jaffee case law in the context of the question of
waiver.
The tension between absolute and conditional privileges stems in
large part from the broad scope of discovery under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and federal courts' general reluctance to limit the
disclosure of any potentially relevant information. As one federal
magistrate judge noted recently, "Contrary to the common law's ap-
proach, contemporary thought has concluded that secrecy is not con-
genial to truth-seeking, and that trial by ambush is incompatible with
the just determination of cases on their merits. '21 5 Thus, the magis-
trate judge continued, "As expansive as is the definition of relevancy
under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the [relevancy] stan-
dard under Rule 26 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is even
broader. ' 216 The burden of challenging the scope of a discovery rule
falls entirely upon the party seeking to limit disclosure, and it is gener-
ally a difficult burden to meet.217
Federal courts invoking notions of fairness and truth-seeking when
considering questions of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege employ analyses based upon the scope of discovery permitted
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, an approach that is sepa-
rate from, and independent of, privilege considerations. The often-
cited ruling in Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., an ADA case consid-
ered soon after Jaffee, may have perpetuated the trend of weighing the
truth-seeking functions of broad discovery in the face of the newly
established privilege. 218 In finding a waiver by the plaintiff, the dis-
trict court judge noted, relying on pre-Jaffee case law, that federal and
state courts had long recognized waiver through raising the issue of
one's psychological state.219 The judge concluded that it would be
215. Hodgdon v. Nw. Univ., 245 F.R.D. 337. 341 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
216. Id. (internal citations omitted). Rule 26 provides, in pertinent part: "Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party .... Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
217. Hodgdon, 245 F.R.D. at 341.
218. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
219. Id. at 130.
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"contrary to the most basic sense of fairness and justice" to permit the
plaintiff to "hide [ ] behind a claim of privilege." 220
Several other courts adopted and expanded this approach. A Ten-
nessee federal court, applying Tennessee law but relying upon federal
law precedent, including Sarko, found a waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege in a sexual harassment case because the plaintiff
sought emotional distress damages and therefore, "application of the
privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information
vital to his defense."'221 A judge in the Northern District of Illinois
found a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and noted that
the plaintiff's psychotherapist's treatment notes were "extremely pro-
bative and material to [the defendant's] defense. '222 Another court
taking the broad view of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege noted in its decision: "It is a well-established rule of law that dis-
covery in discrimination cases should not be narrowly circumscribed.
The scope of discovery is particularly broad in discrimination
cases. '223 Notably, however, all of the cases that the court cited for
support were cases permitting broad discovery of defendants' employ-
ment practices and none involved claims of the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. 224
By basing decisions regarding whether or not there has been a
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege on the importance of
the truth-seeking purposes of discovery and trial, these courts make
two critical errors. First, as noted above, a waiver is most properly
construed as an affirmative act of an individual through which known
rights are not asserted. The benefit flowing to another party from
such waiver of rights, or the corresponding burden imposed by the
assertion of the rights, has no place in the analysis. Although the con-
cept of waiver requires courts to focus on a plaintiff's intentional ac-
tions, courts often give weight to how such evidence would play into
and support defendants' theories to avoid liability or to lessen a dam-
age award. Once courts employ this lens to determine whether to find
a waiver, defendants almost invariably prevail.225 It is a rare case in
220. Id.
221. Kirchner v. Mitsui & Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 129 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
222. Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., No. 97 C 06417, 1999 WL 759401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3,
1999).
223. Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2002)
(citing Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995)).
224. Id.
225. One notable exception is Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Il. 1999), dis-
cussed infra at notes 337-343 and accompanying text and note 373.
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which the evidence would be both relevant and not subject to waiver,
especially given the countless ways that a defendant could use such
evidence at trial. 226
The second flaw in these courts' reasoning is that it overlooks the
fact that privileges necessarily run counter to truth-seeking functions.
Privileges exist where courts or legislatures have determined, for pol-
icy reasons, that such evidence should be protected from disclosure,
notwithstanding its relevance.227 As Dr. Slawson observed in his 1969
criticism of the patient-litigant exception: "Truth like all other good
things may be loved unwisely-maybe pursued too keenly-may cost
too much. ' 228 Thus, balancing privacy, facilitation of communications,
or other values associated with privileges against truth-seeking, fair-
ness, and other aims of discovery occurs in the initial determination of
whether to recognize a privilege in the first place, not whether to infer
that a particular plaintiff has waived such privilege. With respect to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege specifically, Jaffee answered the
balancing question by concluding, as a general matter, that "communi-
cations between a psychotherapist and her patient 'promote[ I suffi-
ciently important interests to outweigh the need for probative
evidence." 229
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Johnson v. Trujillo acknowl-
edged the fundamental nature of a privilege when addressing the issue
of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 230 The court noted
that the defendant's "most compelling argument" for why he needed
access to a personal-injury-claim plaintiff's psychiatric records was
that "the information sought may be relevant to a determination of
the extent to which Johnson's mental suffering is properly attributable
to the accident as opposed to some other cause."'231 However, the
court noted, "it is the very nature of evidentiary witness privileges to
'sacrifice some availability of evidence relevant to an administration
of justice."' 232 Accordingly, "'relevance alone cannot be the test
226. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
227. Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145. 2006 WL 2516625, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
29, 2006) ("[R]elevance alone cannot trigger a finding that a party has waived a privilege, and
most certainly not an absolute privilege.").
228. Slawson, supra note 84, at 352 (quoting Lord Justice Knight Bruce in JOHN FRELINGHUY-
SEN HAGEMAN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS AS A BRANCH OF LEGAL EVIDENCE 10 (1889)).
229. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40. 51 (1980)).
230. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1999).
231. Id. at 157.
232. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 72, at 101 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992)).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
.... '233 The rationale for court-implied waivers of the privilege
arose, not out of a concern for the unfairness of excluding potentially
relevant evidence, but rather the unfairness that may accompany a
plaintiff's use of the privilege as a "sword instead of a shield," by "pa-
rading" a mental or physical condition while asserting the privilege at
the same time.234
As noted above, the nature of psychological harm and the broad
scope of discovery generally enable defendants seeking such records
to easily articulate the potential relevance of a wide range of mental
health records. Relevance, like necessity, is an appropriate consider-
ation under Rule 26, but it is not applicable to the question of
waiver.2 35 A magistrate judge for the District of Maine accurately and
succinctly noted this important distinction: "[P]rivileges operate not-
withstanding relevancy and . . . the proper subject for the waiver anal-
ysis is whether the substance of a particular communication has been
placed in issue, not whether the topic of communication is relevant to
the factual issues of the case."'236
Nonetheless, many courts weigh the potential relevance of the psy-
chotherapy discovery sought when determining whether to find
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The District Court's
rationale in Doe v. City of Chula Vista is typical:
[T]o insure a fair trial, particularly on the element of causation [of
emotional distress] .... defendants should have access to evidence
that Doe's emotional state was caused by something else. Defend-
ants must be free to test the truth of Doe's contention that she is
emotionally upset because of the defendants' conduct. 2 3 7
In Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., a court similarly confused absolute
and conditional privileges. 238 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged dis-
crimination on the basis of race and national origin, and the defendant
sought the complete file of the plaintiffs' psychotherapist. The court
recognized that the records may be subject to a psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege but, after briefly citing the conflicting case law regard-
ing waiver, the court concluded: "It is clear that a balancing of the
interests must be done, the Defendant's interest in obtaining informa-
233. Id. (quoting R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.w.2d 836, 842 (Tex. 1994)).
234. Id. (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 232, § 103, at 146).
235. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 ("[S]tanding alone, the relevance of the
information [sought in discovery] is inadequate to support a finding of an implied waiver.").
236. Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D. Me. Aug.
21, 2001); see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d. 117, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) ("'[Plarties ... do not forfeit [a
privilege] merely by taking a position that the evidence might contradict."' (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323 (1992))).
237. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 569 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
238. Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
[Vol. 58:79
2008] PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 119
tion directly relevant to the claims being made by Plaintiffs, and the
Plaintiffs' privacy interest in shielding personal and potentially irrele-
vant information. ' 239 The district court concluded that precluding dis-
closure of the records, "[t]hough convenient to Plaintiffs . . . is
unsatisfactory to our adversarial system of justice. ' 240 Accordingly, it
held, "[I]t is clear that Defendant's interest in defending Plaintiffs'
claim must outweigh Plaintiffs' privacy interest in these records. '241
While notions of fairness to the parties and the importance of provid-
ing fact finders competing evidence are central, important aims in our
system of adversary litigation, their consideration has no place in an
analysis of whether a plaintiff has waived a privilege if that privilege is
to be given any force.242
Sanchez is among those federal court decisions that not only incor-
rectly weigh the relevance of the information sought to be discovered,
but also improperly frame the question as that of the extent of a plain-
tiff's nebulous "privacy" interest, rather than a legally defined privi-
lege.243 Setting up a comparison of "privacy" to the broad right to
discovery, these courts fail to acknowledge the critical distinction be-
tween privacy, as that concept is generally applied in Rule 26,244 and
239. Id. at 135-36.
240. Id. at 136.
241. Id.
242. Remarkably, several federal courts that seemingly employ a Rule 26 approach fail to
even consider the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. See, e.g., Moore v. Chertoff,
No. 00-953, 2006 WL 1442447, at *2-3 (D.D.C. May 22, 2006) (granting motion to compel dis-
covery of plaintiffs' mental health records on basis of plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress,
without mention of psychotherapist-patient privilege); Bujnicki v. Am. Paving & Excavating,
Inc., No. 99-CV-0646S, 2004 WL 1071736, at *18-19 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004); Owens v. Sprint/
United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657, 659-60 (D. Kan. 2004): LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV.A.
99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2000); Cleveland v. Int'l Paper Co., No.
96-CV-1068, 1997 WL 309408, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 1997) (holding, without reference to the
privilege, that a defendant is entitled to discovery of medical and psychological records where a
sexual harassment plaintiff asserts a claim for even "ordinary" emotional distress).
243. Sanchez, 202 F.R.D. at 135-36. Federal courts have not generally recognized a constitu-
tionally-based right to privacy extending to communications in psychotherapy, although some
state courts have ruled that a limited constitutional right is implicated in such communications.
See In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 567 (Cal. 1970); In re B, 394 A.2d 419, 425 (Pa. 1978); see also
Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1976) (following the reasoning of Lif-
schutz and finding any constitutional right to be only conditional, not absolute). See generally
Carolyn Peddy Courville, Comment, Rationales for the Confidentiality of Psychotherapist-Patient
Communications: Testimonial Privilege and the Constitution, 35 Hous. L. REV. 187, 210-14
(1998); Steven R. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1980).
244. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (noting that, although
Rule 26 "contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be
implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule."). For
example, under Rule 26(c)(1) regarding protective orders: "[T]he court ... may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
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the less flexible concept of privilege. For example, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York found that, by seeking a
claim for emotional distress in association with his ADA claim, a
plaintiff "may not maintain a claim of privacy in any mental health
records. '245 The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, in a
decision granting a defendant's motion to compel production of
mental health records, reasoned that, "[W]hile the Court is mindful of
the privacy issues involved in the discovery of medical records, the
Court also favors the broad contours of discovery. '246 Thus, "where
[the] plaintiff put his emotional condition into issue ... he effectively
waives his right to privacy in any relevant and unprivileged medical
records. '247 Notions of privacy, like those of relevance and fairness,
while laudable, simply have no place in determining whether a plain-
tiff has taken affirmative steps that a court should regard as a knowing
and deliberate waiver of a legally held right.
Notably, the Supreme Court's rationale for the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege was not one of privacy, but of the broader societal in-
terest in encouraging psychotherapy and, presumably, candor during
treatment. Under this rationale, when the privilege is given limited
effect, the adverse impact is on society, not the individual's privacy
interests. For this reason, Jaffee held that a balancing inquiry would
"eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. ' 248 In other words, be-
cause a broader concern for social welfare is implicated through rec-
ognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, consideration of
fairness to individual litigants is beyond the authority of the courts.
Ironically, the instrumental rationale's role as an underpinning of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege may contribute to courts' mis-
placed application of the concept of waiver. 249 Individual judges may
share the skepticism towards the rationale expressed in Justice Scalia's
dissent, in which the Justice quipped: "[H]ow come psychotherapy
or undue burden or expense ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). This can include unnecessary invasions
of a litigant's privacy. See also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2036, at 487 (2d. ed. 1994). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York has noted that "balanc[ing] [a plaintiff's] right to privacy with [a] defendant['s] ...
need for the information ...invokes the principles of Federal Rule 26(c)(4)." Duck v. Port
Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV07-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008).
245. Manessis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Transp., No. 02 CIV. 359SADF, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002).
246. Walker v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. Civ. 00-2604, 2002 WL 32539635, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct.
28, 2002).
247. Id.
248. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996).
249. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.1, at 842 ("Waivability flows from the instru-
mental rationale.").
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got to be a thriving practice before the 'psychotherapist privilege' was
invented?" 250 In the absence of recognition of rationales such as pro-
tecting privacy and autonomy and encouraging individuals to enforce
their federally protected rights, courts fail to appreciate how they un-
dermine the privilege by summarily finding waivers. 251
Cases such as Doe v. City of Chula Vista252 that emphasize the im-
portance of "test[ing] the truth" of emotional distress claims suggest
another possible explanation for courts' extreme reluctance to shield
mental health records from discovery: the essentially unquantifiable
extent of emotional distress and the imprecise nature of emotions and
mental functioning and their causes.25 3 The current civil justice sys-
tem grants wide latitude to fact finders to place monetary value on
nonpecuniary damages, which can sometimes result in seemingly large
verdicts. Public perception and political arguments that there are too
few outer limits to the values that jurors can assign to such damages
have lead to tort reform legislation,254 as well as damages caps under
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.255 Under this view, limiting defendants'
access to potentially relevant discovery on this form of damages may
appear to simply provide yet another advantage to plaintiffs seeking
oversized verdicts.
4. Scope of the Waiver and Alternative Sources of Emotional
Distress
Determining whether a party has waived the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege does not necessarily resolve precisely what the party
has waived. Thus, judges often grapple with an additional layer of
controversy regarding which records fall within the scope of the
waiver. One significant area of discovery sparring is whether a plain-
tiff who is found to have waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege
250. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. See SHUMAN & WEINER, supra note 69, at 136-37 (arguing that basing the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege on a deontological, rather than instrumental, rationale enables courts to
take a "different [and superior] approach to the structure of the privilege and its exceptions").
252. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal 1999).
253. See ABELE, supra note 40, at 8 (suggesting that there is a long-standing judicial suspicion
of emotional distress claims).
254. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS 96 (2004) (noting that awards for nonpecuniary damages are a particular
target of tort reform advocates because such awards are regarded by many as "arbitrary"); Steve
Lohr, Bush's Next Target: Malpractice Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, § 3, at 1 (noting that
one feature of "tort reform" proposals is caps on "non-economic damages," including those for
emotional distress).
255. Steven A. Holmes, Costs, Not Quotas, Worry Some Foes of Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 1990, § 4, at 4 (discussing the drive to impose damage caps in Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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must disclose mental health treatment received prior to the incident at
issue in the litigation. Generally, once a court concludes that there
has been an implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it
grants defendants broad access, not only to records of treatment for
the emotional distress for which recovery is sought, but also to any
and all mental health records including those from years prior to the
incident at issue in the litigation. In so doing, it skips two critical steps
in a proper analysis: it fails to consider whether such discovery falls
within the Rule 26 concept of relevance, and it fails to link the scope
of the waiver to the purported affirmative conduct on the part of the
plaintiff giving rise to the waiver.
While the relevance of records sought in discovery is not a proper
consideration for determining whether there has been a waiver of any
privilege with respect to such records, a court may always limit discov-
ery of information that is not "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. ' 256 Because recovery of damages in
civil rights claims, including those brought pursuant to § 1983 or any
of the federal nondiscrimination statutes, is a remedy that essentially
sounds in tort,257 parties and judges look to tort law principles to de-
termine the relevance of evidence in support of or limiting damages
claims. A plaintiff is entitled to full compensation for all injuries prox-
imately caused by the defendant's acts even if the injuries were "ag-
gravated by reason of a preexisting physical or mental condition. '258
Accordingly, a defendant may not use a plaintiff's preexisting condi-
tion, such as a particular emotional vulnerability, as a vehicle to es-
cape liability for emotional distress damages. This is reflected by the
"eggshell skull" rule that a "defendant takes the plaintiff as it finds
him or her. ' 259 The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on compensatory
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
257. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION 1 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that employment discrimination case law has "relied in-
creasingly on damages as a remedy for employment discrimination and therefore on tort
principles to determine liability"). See also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,
305 (1986) ("We have repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates 'a species of tort liability'
..... ); Curtis v  Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (noting that a damages claim brought pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 "sounds basically in tort-the statute merely defines a new legal duty,
and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's
wrongful breach"). The same analysis applies to damages claims sought under other civil rights
statutes. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 81-82 ("Civil rights violations are torts. They have gener-
ated an important specialty, in which the courts look to common law tort rules as models without
necessarily accepting their limitations.").
258. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 239 (2003).
259. Id. See also Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that, under Texas
law: "[T]ortfeasors take their victims as they find them, even when the claimed harm is mental
anguish or emotional distress. A victim's particular susceptibility will not reduce the damages
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damages also indicates that a defendant will be liable for emotional
distress damages of a plaintiff who was previously "emotionally sensi-
tive. '260 This rule suggests that a defendant may not offer evidence of
a plaintiff's preexisting mental condition as a means to avoid liability
for emotional distress that results from the defendant's actions.
What is less clear, however, is whether a defendant may assert that
it should not be held liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's emo-
tional distress damages, due to an underlying mental disorder or alter-
native sources of emotional distress. A defendant is liable for any
harm, including emotional distress, so long as her "conduct is a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the harm."'261 As a general principle,
a defendant may seek apportionment of damages among other causes,
but only where it makes a showing that "there is a reasonable basis for
determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. '262 Oth-
erwise, the harm is deemed to be "indivisible" and not subject to
apportionment. 263
available."); Miley v. Landry, 582 So. 2d 833, 837 (La. 1991) ("When a defendant's negligent
conduct aggravates a pre-existing condition, the victim must be compensated for the full extent
of the aggravation." (internal citations omitted)); DOBBS, supra note 24, at 851-52 (explaining
that thin skull rules apply to claims for emotional harm, except in cases where a person would
not be expected to suffer any emotional harm at all and hence the plaintiff's reaction to the
event was wholly unforeseeable).
260. Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available under § 102 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) T 5360, July 14, 1992, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/damages.html [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance] ("The fact
that the complaining party may be unusually emotionally sensitive and incur great emotional
harm from discriminatory conduct will not absolve the respondent from responsibility for the
greater emotional harm.").
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965) ("The word 'substantial' is used
to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to
lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause .... "). The same analysis applies to the torts of
negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress, which are sometimes included in com-
plaints alleging discrimination or violation of civil rights. The defendant's wrongful actions need
not be the sole cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress, but must be a "substantial cause." See
Ferguson v. United States Army, 938 F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Enforcement Guidance.
supra note 260.
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). The rules set forth in section 433A
apply not only to instances where there may be more than one tortfeasor, but also
where one or more of the contributing causes is an innocent one, as where the negli-
gence of a defendant combines with the innocent conduct of another person, or with
the operation of a force of nature, or with a pre-existing condition which the defendant
has not caused, to bring about the harm to the plaintiff.
Id. cmt. a.
263. Id. cmt. i ("Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any
logical, reasonable, or practical division."). See also Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091,
1093 (Me. 1995) ("The single injury rule places any hardship resulting from the difficulty of
apportionment on the proven wrongdoer and not on the innocent plaintiff."); DOBBS, supra note
24, at 425.
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied these princi-
ples to questions of discovery and burden shifting in a sexual harass-
ment class action case where the defendants had advanced an
alternative source of emotional distress damages argument. In Jenson
v. Eveleth Taconite Co., female employees of a large mining company
brought a class action lawsuit under Title VII seeking remedies for
widespread and systematic sexual harassment. 264 The Special Master
appointed by the district court permitted broad discovery of the plain-
tiffs' personal backgrounds including "detailed medical histories,
childhood experiences, domestic abuse, abortions, and sexual relation-
ships. '265 Although the Special Master initially reasoned that such
discovery was proper because it was the defendants' burden to show
that events other than the alleged harassment proximately caused the
plaintiffs' emotional distress, at the time of trial he re-assigned plain-
tiffs the burden of disproving alternative causes of their distress.266
Reversing on appeal, the Eighth Circuit criticized both the denial of
the plaintiffs' requests for protective orders against such invasive dis-
covery267 and the reassignment of the burden of proof on causation. 268
Citing a string of cases from other courts and legal contexts, the panel
noted that a "tortfeasor is liable for all of [the] natural and proximate
consequences" of its actions,269 which "include[d] damages assessed
. . . for harm caused to a plaintiff who happens to have a fragile
psyche. ' 270 Because the Special Master in Jenson had concluded that
the plaintiffs' emotional harm was indivisible, the defendants were
foreclosed from seeking apportionment, rendering the plaintiffs' prior
psychological and medical histories irrelevant. 271
264. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997). The claims were filed prior
to the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but the plaintiffs were able to seek emo-
tional distress damages under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Id. at 1290.
265. Id. at 1292.
266. Id. at 1293.
267. Id. at 1292-93.
268. Id. at 1294.
269. Id.
270. Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1295. The plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden largely because
the Special Master also precluded them from offering any expert testimony in support of their
emotional distress claims on the basis that none of the proffered experts had "advanced a vali-
dated theory" for allocating "causal effect of multiple psychological stresses or trauma." Id. at
1297. This ruling was also reversed on appeal. Id. at 1298.
271. Id. at 1294. However, a comment to section 433 of the RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF
TORTS, titled Considerations Important in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct is Substantial
Factor in Producing Harm, suggests that a fact finder may consider whether "[slome other event
which is a contributing factor in producing the harm may have such a predominant effect in
bringing it about as to make the effect of the actor's negligence insignificant and, therefore, to
prevent it from being a substantial factor." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. d
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Following Jenson, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri in Robinson v. Canon U.S.A., Inc. precluded de-
fendants from seeking discovery regarding whether the plaintiff in the
sexual harassment claim had any extramarital affairs at the time of the
alleged harassment.272 While the case did not involve the discovery of
mental health records, the analysis applies with equal force in cases in
which a defendant bases a discovery request for such records on the
rationale that it is exploring potential alternative causes of emotional
distress. The judge in Robinson noted that the defendants there had
suggested "no way in which they can satisfy their obligation to segre-
gate the 'harassment-induced stress' from the 'extramarital affair-in-
duced stress,"' and therefore would have no basis to make such
argument to the jury at trial.273 The significance of the ruling was not
lost on the judge, as she noted: "The Court concedes that it may be
impossible for any defendant to satisfy this burden because psycholog-
ical considerations are not subject to such nice categorizations; none-
theless, the rule is clearly established in Jenson.''274 Accordingly,
"[d]efendants cannot simply present evidence of alleged stressors and
leave it to the jury to determine whether, and to what extent, the emo-
tional damage attributable to Plaintiff's various stress factors is
divisible. "275
Indeed, it is fair to question whether emotional distress damages
and other psychological injuries can ever meet the requirements for a
"divisible" harm that could be subject to apportionment. Determin-
ing and quantifying causation of psychological distress is not an exer-
cise that contemporary psychotherapists generally undertake. The
(1965). This would suggest that some alternative causes of harm, including emotional distress,
may be the proper subject of trial evidence (and by extension discovery).
272. Robinson v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 82 FEP Cases 1129 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2000). A sepa-
rate, additional basis of the court's ruling was Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which limits the
admissibility of evidence of a civil plaintiff's sexual history. Id.
273. Id. at 1130.
274. Id.
275. Id. Further, there are indications that evidence of prior mental health treatment can be
effective in lowering defendants' exposure. Courts, and presumably juries, have decreased dam-
age awards in civil rights cases based upon evidence of alternative and preexisting causes of
emotional distress. For example, in a sexual harassment case, Hurley v. Atlantic City Police De-
partment, 933 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1996), the court granted the defendant's motion for remitti-
tur. reducing the jury's award of $575,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress to
$175,000. The court based its decision in part upon the opinion of the defendant's expert psychi-
atric witness that "the difficulties plaintiff has faced and continues to face are rooted in sources
other than workplace harassment, such as a troubled childhood marked by sexual molestation,
abandonment, and foster homes; physical abuse by both of her husbands; and other severe per-
sonal, marital and family problems unrelated to her work environment." Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at
424.
20081
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has little to say
about the causes of such disorders. 276 As one pair of defense-oriented
forensic examiners asserted:
[I]n the contemporary biopsychosocial medical model of diagnosis,
the "causation" of mental events is explained from the perspective
of multiple interactions between biology, psychology and the social
milieu. From the biopsychosocial perspective, all of the potentially
interacting causes (preexisting, concurrent, and subsequent) that
may explain a particular mental injury must be investigated in order
to arrive at a comprehensive and valid understanding of the alleged
mental damages. 277
The authors argue that this comprehensive approach to causation jus-
tifies "a thorough and careful investigation of a plaintiff's life course
and developmental history prior to, during, and after the allegedly in-
jurious event. '278 But the complexity of determining causation cannot
alone provide the rationale for compelling discovery of a plaintiff's
lifetime of mental health records absent a clear legal vehicle to ad-
vance such arguments.
Nonetheless, courts generally permit defendants to discover histori-
cal mental health records upon a finding of waiver, and they offer lit-
tle scrutiny of the relevance of such records. Apparently, no court
considering the issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege has followed the reasoning of Jenson or Robinson or broader tort
principles of apportionment of harm. In Rose v. Vermont Mutual In-
surance Co., the court permitted extensive discovery of a plaintiff's
mental health history as a result of her claim for emotional distress
damages, which is typical of courts' bare mention of the scope of dis-
covery in cases where a defendant seeks a plaintiff's mental health
records.279 Once the plaintiff was found to have waived the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, the court concluded that such waiver "'ap-
276. Drukteinis, supra note 19 ("In general, DSM-IV-TR does not focus on the etiology of
psychiatric diagnosis and, by extension, causation."). The notable exception is the diagnostic
criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which includes: "[Tihe person experienced, wit-
nessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or
serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
supra note 206, at 467.
277. Mark I. Levy & Saul E. Rosenberg, The "Eggshell Plaintiff' Revisited: Causation of
Mental Damages in Civil Litigation, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 204, 205
(2003).
278. Id.
279. Rose v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., No:1:06-CV-211, 2007 WL 3333394 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007) (di-
versity case in which the court purported to follow Vermont law on the scope of the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege). The court also concluded that the fact that the plaintiff's depression had
an onset prior to the accident took it out of the possible "garden-variety" protection afforded to
some emotional distress claims. Id. at *2.
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plie[d] to the discovery of matters causally or historically related to
the patient-plaintiff's health put in issue by the injuries and damages
claimed in the action."280
Similarly, in EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Soci-
ety, the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment and gender discrimina-
tion.281 The court denied the plaintiff's request to limit discovery of
her mental health records to the health care providers she saw during
or after her period of employment with the defendant and to further
limit the information to that "associated with [the plaintiff's] employ-
ment. '282 The trial court reasoned that "information in the records
may shed light on other contributing causes of [the plaintiff's] claims
of emotional distress. '283
In addition to addressing these questions of relevance before a
plaintiff's lifetime of mental health treatment can be subject to discov-
ery, a court must also make a specific finding that the plaintiff waived
the psychotherapist-patient privilege with respect to the communica-
tions with each treatment provider, a step notably absent from federal
courts' analysis of waiver. Thus, merely stating a claim for emotional
distress arising from an incidence of discrimination in 2005, for exam-
ple, cannot serve as a basis for seeking psychotherapy records from
the year 2001. Rather, a court must identify an affirmative act by the
plaintiff consistent with a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege as to those communications from 2001 as well. In a case where
the plaintiff releases the earlier records to a current psychotherapist
or a forensic examiner who will offer an expert opinion based in part
upon such records, a court may properly find an express or implied
waiver with respect to those records. In the absence of evidence of an
action by a plaintiff effectuating such a waiver, the records cannot be
280. Id. (quoting Mattison v. Poulen, 353 A.2d 327, 330 (Vt. 1976)).
281. EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., No. 8:03CV165, 2007 WL 649298, at *3
(D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2007).
282. Id.
283. Id. See also Bujnicki v. Am. Paving & Excavating, Inc., No. 99-CV-0646S, 2004 WL
1071736, at *19 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004) (permitting discovery of plaintiff's psychotherapy
records for a period back to two years prior to the commencement of her employment with
defendants); Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 31,
2002) (permitting discovery of plaintiff's psychotherapy records for a period back to three years
prior to when the discriminatory conduct was alleged to have occurred); McKenna v. Cruz, No.
98 CIV. 1853, 1998 WL 809533, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) (permitting discovery of plain-
tiff's psychotherapy records for the five-year period prior to the incident at issue in plaintiff's
excessive force claim).
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subject to discovery, regardless of the defendant's theory of
relevance.284
5. Compelled Psychological Exams Under Rule 35
In several cases, a discovery request for the release of psychother-
apy records is paired with a demand for a psychological or psychiatric
evaluation under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
285
Courts sometimes couple and often confuse the analysis of waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and Rule 35 psychological exam-
inations.286  Such confusion is not entirely surprising. In the years
before federal courts analyzed whether a plaintiff could be compelled
to turn over records and other information regarding her mental
health under a theory of implied waiver, courts considered whether
she could be compelled to submit to a psychological examination by
placing her mental condition "in controversy."28 7 While the two ques-
tions appear similar, the distinctions are critical to the proper applica-
tion of waiver of a privilege.
Rule 35, in a somewhat different form from its current language,
was among the original civil procedure rules promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court in 1938.288 It was met with controversy
because Rule 35 reversed, through court rule rather than statute, the
well-settled rule in federal courts prohibiting compelled physical ex-
284. See Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that, while the
psychotherapist-patient privilege may limit a defendant's access to certain records, a defendant
has other means, such as cross-examination, to challenge a plaintiff's emotional distress claims).
285. Rule 35 provides, in pertinent part: "[T]he court in which the action is pending may
order [a] party [whose mental or physical condition is in controversy] to submit to a physical or
mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner." FED. R. CIv. P. 35(a). See also
Gaines-Hanna v. Farmington Pub. Sch., No. 04-CV-74910-DT, 2006 WL 932074, at *10 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 7, 2006); Young v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assoc., II, P.C., No. Civ. A. 03-2034,
2004 WL 1813232, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2004); Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D.
551, 553 (N.D. Ga. 2001); LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at
*4 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2000); Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Colo. 1998). In Young,
the court did not expressly find a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but the court
did grant the defendants' motion to compel production of documents and answers to interroga-
tories pertaining to the plaintiff's mental health history based, with no analysis, upon the same
rationale ("plaintiff has placed her mental state at issue") applied to its decision to grant the
defendant's motion to take a Rule 35 psychiatric examination of the plaintiff. Young, 2004 WL
1813232, at *34.
286. In Gaines-Hanna, the trial court applied the post-Jaffee case law of implied waiver to
determine whether the defendants were entitled to subject the plaintiff to a Rule 35 psychiatric
examination, and based upon that analysis, further concluded that the defendants were entitled
to receive records documenting the plaintiff's psychiatric treatment during the prior twelve
years. Gaines-Hanna, 2006 WL 932074, at *8, 11-12.
287. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
288. 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 244, § 2231.
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amination of litigants.289 One of the earliest challenges came in Sib-
bach v. Wilson & Co., in which the Supreme Court upheld the new
rule as a valid exercise of the Court's power to promulgate procedural
rules pursuant to the 1934 Rules Enabling Act. 290 Joined by three
Justices, Justice Frankfurter vigorously argued in dissent that the
Court did not have the power to effect such a "drastic change in public
policy," which affected the "inviolability of a person. ''291
In 1964, a divided Supreme Court construed Rule 35 in Schlagen-
hauf v. Holder, a case that considered the applicability of the rule to a
compelled examination of a defendant. 292 The Court specifically re-
jected the argument that Sibbach had been decided on the grounds
that a plaintiff, by bringing an action for damages, had somehow
waived his privacy interests.293 Indeed, Justice Goldberg, writing for
the majority, seemed to reject a waiver rationale, noting that it would
mean that "a plaintiff has waived a right by exercising his right of
access to the federal courts," and that "[s]uch a result might create
constitutional problems. '294 Rather, the basis for compelling exami-
nations of either plaintiffs or defendants was nothing more than the
plain language of Rule 35, which was within the Court's authority to
promulgate. 295
Although the Court upheld Rule 35, it also provided guidelines to
the lower courts regarding the application of the rule. It emphasized
that the rule "requires discriminating application by the trial judge,
who must decide, as an initial matter in every case, whether the party
requesting a mental or physical examination or examinations has ade-
quately demonstrated the existence of the Rule's requirements of 'in
controversy' and 'good cause." 296 As an example of a fairly straight-
forward determination of these issues, the Court noted: "A plaintiff
in a negligence action who asserts mental or physical injury places that
mental or physical injury clearly in controversy and provides the de-
fendant with good cause for an examination to determine the exis-
289. Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250
(1891)).
290. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 16 (majority opinion) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072, formerly § 723b).
291. Id. at 17-18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
292. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
293. Id. at 113-14.
294. Id. at 114. The comments on waiver were prompted by Justice Douglas's dissent, in
which he argued that a defendant cannot be considered to have waived the "inviolability of the
person" because he has been "dragged" to court. Id. at 126 (Douglas, J., dissenting). By con-
trast, a plaintiff may "choose between his privacy and his purse." Id.
295. Id. at 114 (majority opinion).
296. Id. at 118-19.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tence and extent of such asserted injury. '297 By contrast, the
defendant in that case had not "affirmatively put into issue his own
mental or physical condition" through any sort of claim or defense of
his own. 298
In case law that parallels and sometimes intersects that regarding
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, many courts have held
that Rule 35 psychiatric examinations are not warranted solely on the
basis of a claim for emotional distress damages,299 or with respect to
liability in sexual harassment claims. 300 Generally, courts do not order
such examinations absent allegations of ongoing emotional distress. 30
For example, in Fox v. Gates Corp., the court attempted to summarize
the guidelines that had developed for determining when a court may
order a Rule 35 mental health examination and concluded that there
were five pertinent factors, one or more of which must be present:
(1) plaintiff has asserted a specific cause of action for intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) plaintiff has alleged a
specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder; (3) plaintiff has
claimed unusually severe emotional distress; (4) plaintiff has offered
expert testimony in support of her claim for emotional distress dam-
ages; and (5) plaintiff concedes that her mental condition is "in con-
troversy" within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a). 302
Relying on case law involving waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the court noted that claims for mere "garden-variety" emo-
tional distress were not sufficient to trigger the Rule 35 factors.30 3
However, in the same opinion the court concluded that the plaintiff
had waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege with respect to dis-
297. Id. at 119 (internation citations omitted).
298. Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 121.
299. See Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303. 307 (D. Colo. 1998) ("A minority of courts have
held that a plaintiff puts her mental condition 'in controversy' by simply making a claim for
emotional distress damages as part of an employment discrimination claim."); Jennifer Wriggins,
Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure Litigation,
77 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1072 n.234 (1997).
300. See Margaret Bull Kovera & Stacie A. Cass, Compelled Mental Health Examinations,
Liability Decisions, and Damage Awards in Sexual Harassment Cases: Issues for Jury Research, 8
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 96, 98 (2002).
301. Id.; see also Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (hold-
ing that, because the plaintiffs' claims were for "past, not present" emotional distress, there was
no basis to order a Rule 35 psychological examination).
302. Fox, 179 F.R.D. at 307.
303. Id. (citing Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126
F.R.D. 422, 426 (D. Mass. 1989)).
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closure of her psychotherapy records as a result of her emotional dis-
tress damage claim.30 4
As the majority noted in Schlagenhauf, Rule 35 provides federal
courts the authority to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to
compel a litigant to submit to a particular form of pretrial discov-
ery.30 5 It does not provide authority to compel a waiver of a recog-
nized right. However, courts have ignored this important distinction
and instead based their decisions on their own perception of the rela-
tive intrusiveness of a mental examination versus the compelled dis-
closure of mental health treatment records. Specifically, some courts
erroneously conclude that a Rule 35 examination is necessarily more
intrusive and, therefore, courts can be less circumspect about the re-
lease of psychotherapy records. 306
Rule 35 examinations are unquestionably intrusive and can be quite
distressing, particularly where an inordinate focus is given to abuse,
trauma, and sexual and gynecological history in sexual harassment
cases.30 7 However, such examinations do not implicate the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege unless disclosure of prior treatment records
is included in the order compelling examination. 30 8 While an exam-
iner might request past psychotherapy records or ask the plaintiff
some questions about past treatment, detailed disclosure of prior psy-
chiatric treatment is not a necessary component of the exam. Rather,
the examination is a one-time evaluation during litigation in which no
privileged communications are made. There is little risk that the Rule
35 exam will result in the revelation of deep secrets and vulnerabili-
ties, such as might be revealed during a psychotherapy session outside
of the context of litigation, because the plaintiff knows that the results
of the exam and all statements made during the course of it will be
revealed to the opposing party.30 9 Indeed, in Vasconcellos v. Cybex
304. Id. at 306. The court did impose some limitations on the time frame on records that
would be subject to disclosure and, indeed, it was not clear from the ruling whether there were in
fact any records that would be disclosed as a result.
305. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
306. See, e.g., Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 623 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("The inva-
sion of privacy occasioned by allowing opposing counsel to obtain copies of a plaintiff's psycho-
logical records, where there is a claim of ordinary mental distress, is exceedingly less
burdensome than a Rule 35(a) examination.").
307. See Louise F. Fitzgerald, A New Framework for Sexual Harassment Cases, TRIAL, Mar.
2003, at 36, 38; Streseman, supra note 38, at 1272.
308. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 99.
309. See EEOC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ("[I]f anything, delving
into a plaintiff's medical or psychological records is even more invasive than conducting a medi-
cal or psychological examination ...."); Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 632 (S.D.
Cal. 1999) ("Many, if not most, people would undoubtedly prefer to submit to a mental examina-
tion, in which they have a degree of control over what information is revealed, than to have the
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International, Inc., the plaintiff volunteered to undergo a psychiatric
examination in support of her motion to quash defendant's subpoena
of her treating psychotherapist's records. 310
Thus, intrusiveness is not the proper lens through which the two
discovery issues should be addressed; rather, courts should look to the
nature of the rights at stake. The Supreme Court has recognized the
psychotherapist-patient privilege as a right held by all individuals,
which must be respected and enforced in the absence of a finding of
waiver. Accordingly, the analysis employed under a discovery rule
has no application.
6. The Special Problem of ADA Cases
The issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the
context of ADA cases presents a special problem. Several courts have
been quick to conclude that asserting a claim under the ADA effectu-
ates a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, either because
the plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages or simply because she
alleges that she is disabled due to a psychiatric condition. Some courts
have made remarkably broad proclamations of this conclusion while
being particularly dismissive of plaintiffs' assertions of the psychother-
apist-patient privilege.
One of the leading cases articulating the broad view of waiver,
Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co.,3 1' is an ADA case decided the year
after Jaffee. The plaintiff alleged that she was terminated from her
employment after she disclosed to her employer that she required
medication to treat depression and sought an accommodation. 312 The
court noted, based largely on Third Circuit and Pennsylvania state
court precedent, that a party waives the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege by "placing her mental condition at issue. ' 313 The court easily
found that the plaintiff had placed her mental condition in issue and
records of their past psychotherapy sessions disclosed to their adversaries in litigation."). The
Supreme Court of Colorado similarly noted:
We can imagine many circumstances in which the compelled disclosure of sensitive and
private medical and counseling records is as offensive or more offensive to a litigant's
privacy, health, and dignity interests as a court-ordered mental examination would be.
Moreover, unlike a court-ordered mental examination, court-ordered disclosure of con-
fidential records related to mental health treatment undercuts the additional, public
interest furthered by the privileges of encouraging citizens to seek help for their emo-
tional problems.
Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999).
310. Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 709 (D. Md. 1997).
311. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
312. Id. at 129.
313. Id. at 130.
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therefore waived any psychotherapist-patient privilege by asserting
that she was a qualified individual with a disability "by virtue of suf-
fering from clinical depression. '31 4 Accordingly, the court ordered
her to release "all records that contain[ed] confidential communica-
tions with her psychiatrist that [were] relevant to her mental condition
during the time she was in Defendant's employ. '315
One of the starkest statements of waiver in the ADA context was
made by a judge in Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc. 316 The court
considered the issue of waiver in a case in which the plaintiff brought
a claim under the ADA alleging that the defendant failed to reasona-
bly accommodate her Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and "severe de-
pression. ' 317  The court ordered the plaintiff to comply with all
outstanding requests for discovery-including those seeking her medi-
cal records-and to "make all of her experts available for deposi-
tion. '318 The court reasoned: "In an action under the ADA, a
plaintiff's medical history is relevant in its entirety. '319 The court
made no reference to the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege or whether a finding of implied waiver was appropriate, and in-
stead expressed surprise that the plaintiff resisted releasing her
records. 320 Although the court acknowledged that "[e]lements of a
claim under the ADA touch upon the most private and intimate de-
tails of a plaintiff's life," the court stated broadly: "ADA plaintiffs,
like plaintiffs in an action for medical malpractice, waive all privileges
and privacy interests related to their claim by virtue of filing the com-
plaint. '321 Several other cases have followed a similar approach, hold-
ing that the assertion of an ADA claim is sufficient in itself to waive
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 322
314. Id.
315. Id. The court also ordered the plaintiff to submit to a mental examination pursuant to
Rule 35. Id. at 131.
316. Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
317. Id. at 91.
318. Id. at 92. It is not clear from the decision whether any treating psychotherapists had been
designated by the plaintiff as testifying experts.
319. Id.
320. The court noted, "Although the action is based on the ADA, plaintiff has resisted disclos-
ing her medical records." Id. at 91.
321. Id. at 92.
322. Calder v. TCI Cablevision of Mo., Inc., No. 4:99-CV-01005, 2001 WL 991459, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. July 21, 2001); Metzger v. Francis W. Parker Sch., No. 00 C 5200, 2001 WL 910443, at *3
(N.D. I1. Aug. 10, 2001); Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., No. 97 C 06417, 1999 WL 759401, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999); Patterson v. Chi. Ass'n for Retarded Children, No. 96 C 4713, 1997 WL
323575, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1997); Iwanejko v. Cohen & Grigsby, P.C., No. 2:03CV1855, 2005
WL 4043954, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 1995).
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These cases reveal misplaced assumptions about the relevancy and
significance of such evidence. With respect to establishing disability-
as opposed to emotional distress damages-the court will not ask the
jury to quantify precisely the extent of a plaintiff's mental condition,
and questions of causation have no role whatsoever in an ADA analy-
sis.323 Rather, the definition of disability is a threshold inquiry regard-
ing the application of the statute. Similarly, analogies to medical
malpractice cases, such as that found in the Butler case, are improper.
In those cases, the medical care by the defendant is the central issue
and filing such a claim is deemed to be a waiver of otherwise privi-
leged communications with the defendant. In an ADA case, the evi-
dence and the fact finder should focus on whether there was unlawful
discrimination based upon the plaintiff's disability. As commentators
have observed, however, federal courts are too preoccupied with the
definition of disability; therefore, it is not surprising that they would
use the necessity of proof as a basis to find a broad waiver of the
privilege. 324
V. BRINGING CERTAINTY TO THE QUESTION OF WAIVER
Clearly, the current framing of the question of waiver of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege is unworkable, as courts themselves note
the sharp differences among their approaches. 325 This uncertainty
renders the privilege nearly illusory, and by so doing, undermines an
alternative instrumental rationale for the existence of the privilege:
the privilege enables those who have sought mental health treatment
to bring civil rights claims in federal court without concern that their
treatment will necessarily become a central focus of discovery, and
perhaps trial, over their objections. In order to serve this rationale,
federal courts should approach questions of waiver of the psychother-
apist-patient privilege in a manner that is consistent with the general
323. Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You're Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA
Definition of Disability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1, 64, 69-70 (2007) (contrasting jury assessments of tort
damages and determinations of whether an ADA plaintiff meets the statute's definition of
disability).
324. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
91, 92 (2000). One wonders whether courts would be so quick to conclude that there is a waiver
of the clergy-believer privilege in every claim based upon religious discrimination. Indeed, I
have not found a single case in which this issue was even raised.
325. See, e.g., Duck v. Port Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV07-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2008) ("The law on waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege is not set-
tled."); Samaan v. Sauer, No. Civ-S-07-0960, 2008 WL 214680, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2008)
("Lower courts disagree on the test to determine whether the privilege is waived.").
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concepts of waiver in the law and that provides all litigants meaningful
protection from unnecessary intrusion into their mental health history.
A. An Alternative Instrumental Rationale
Individuals who have sought mental health treatment hold an un-
certain privilege against disclosure of their psychotherapy records and
therefore face a difficult dilemma when considering whether to pursue
a civil claim in federal court. They must consider whether they are
willing to run the risk of opening the door to detailed information
about their mental health treatment by alleging emotional injury re-
sulting from a deprivation of civil rights or other wrongdoing, or by
alleging discrimination on the basis of mental illness. Undoubtedly,
for some, the answer may simply be that the risk is too great. Thus, on
the question of waiver, courts must shift their focus from an instru-
mental rationale based upon the questionable assumption that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege ensures that individuals seek psycho-
therapy in the first place, to a more realistic and pertinent instrumen-
tal rationale, namely, that of ensuring that those who have or had a
mental illness and received treatment are not broadly discouraged
from using the courts to remedy a deprivation of their rights.326
Professor Anita Hill, whose mental health was the subject of scru-
tiny during the confirmation hearing of Justice Clarence Thomas,327
spoke on this issue in 1993.328 She noted that only three percent of
victims of sexual harassment pursue relief through litigation, and she
attributes this to the financial and emotional burdens of pursuing such
claims. She specifically argued that evidence rules that allow discov-
ery of a sexual harassment plaintiff's mental health history have a
"chilling effect" on victims' decisions whether to pursue litigation.329
326. Robinson, supra note 37, at 77 ("Millions of American workers are effectively thwarted
from exercising their civil rights merely because they have undergone psychotherapy.").
327. PERLIN, supra note 42, at 22; see also JANE FLAX, THE AMERICAN DREAM IN BLACK &
WHITE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS HEARINGS 65 (1998) ("Ostensibly searching for a motive, the
senators speculated extensively about Anita Hill's psychology and relationships with men.").
328. Thaai Walker, Anita Hills Tells of Stress in Sex Harassment Cases, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5,
1993, at A7.
329. Id. See also Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting that
"[d]iscovery of intimate aspects of plaintiffs' lives ... has the clear potential to discourage sexual
harassment litigants from prosecuting lawsuits such as the instant one."); Beth S. Frank, Note,
Protecting the Privacy of Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs: The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and
Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
639, 663 (2001) ("Without the protection of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, individuals
who seek therapy will be reluctant to bring suit or will not bring suit at all for legitimate claims of
harassment out of fear that their mental health will be placed on trial.").
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of California, in an early decision ana-
lyzing the patient-litigant exception, considered the risk that a broad
reading of the exception "might effectively deter many psychothera-
peutic patients from instituting any general claim for mental suffering
and damage out of fear of opening up all past communications to dis-
covery. '330 Such "result would clearly be an intolerable and over-
broad intrusion into the patient's privacy, not sufficiently limited to
the legitimate state interest embodied in the provision and would cre-
ate opportunities for harassment and blackmail. '331 Accordingly, the
court construed the exception as a "limited waiver concomitant with
the purposes of the exception. '332
More recently, the EEOC noted the importance of a court's con-
struction of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the
agency's ability to bring actions to remedy incidents of discrimination.
When, in a class action race discrimination case, a magistrate judge
denied a defendant's motion to compel discovery of, among other
things, the plaintiffs' mental health histories and records, the agency's
regional attorney praised the ruling as "one of those genuinely impor-
tant court decisions which, unfortunately, sometimes disappear with-
out ever making it onto the radar screen. ' 333 The attorney noted that
the magistrate judge "forcefully rejected the employer's attempt to
use discovery to put the lives of victims of employment discrimination
under the microscope" and that it was "good to win this one and to
see civil rights litigants protected from having their lives turned up-
side-down and unnecessarily subjected to the proverbial 'third
degree.' "334
Before the Jaffee opinion, one commentator noted that compelled
mental examinations under Rule 35
330. In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 570 (Cal. 1970).
331. Id.
332. Id. (holding that the communications subject to disclosure must be "directly relevant" to
the specific conditions alleged by the plaintiff in seeking damages for personal injuries, and not
for "other aspects of the patient-litigant's personality, even though they may in some sense, be
'relevant' to the substantive issues of litigation.").
333. Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Federal Court Sharply Limits
Employer's Attempt to Probe Job Bias Victims' Medical, Arrest and Litigation Histories (Nov.
29, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/11-29-07.html [hereinafter EEOC Press Re-
lease] (quoting John Hendrickson). The court had adopted a somewhat narrow view of the
waiver and held that merely asserting claims for emotional distress did not in itself effectuate a
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege provided that the plaintiffs limited their claims to
"negative emotions ... experienced as the intrinsic result of the defendant's alleged conduct."
EEOC v. Area Erectors, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 549, 552 (N.D. I1. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
334. EEOC Press Release, supra note 333.
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may best serve defendants not by illuminating facts at issue in a
case, but by intimidating potential sexual harassment plaintiffs into
silence. The scope of such examinations can be dauntingly broad
and invasive, permitting inquiry into the plaintiff's entire psycholog-
ical and sexual history. The specter of this invasive inquiry may dis-
courage victims from bringing valid claims. 335
Given that many consider disclosure of psychotherapy notes to be
even more invasive, one can assume that such disclosure serves as a
more significant deterrent than does the possibility of a psychological
examination.
Moreover, where plaintiffs are not dissuaded altogether from bring-
ing claims, they may attempt to avoid triggering a finding of implied
waiver by narrowing their claims. In light of the case law reviewed
above, astute plaintiffs' attorneys will engage in careful complaint-
drafting or make subsequent amendments to pleadings where they
seek to preserve their clients' privilege. 336 For example, in Santelli v.
Electro-Motive, the plaintiff avoided waiver only by restricting her
damages claim to "negative emotions" such as "humiliation, embar-
rassment, and other similar emotions ... as the intrinsic result of the
defendant's alleged conduct. '337 She was barred from presenting any
evidence of "symptoms or conditions that she suffered (e.g. sleepless-
ness, nervousness, depression)." 338 As a direct result of these self-im-
posed limitations, her communications with her psychotherapist were
"no longer relevant" and for that reason there would be no waiver of
the privilege. 339 Similarly, in Koch v. Cox, the appellate court noted
that the plaintiff's complaint made no reference to emotional distress
damages, eliminating one of the defendant's bases for seeking psycho-
therapy records. 340 Although courts generally deny access to the
records as a result of such strategic pleading, the final result is of
course a victory for the defendants since they succeed in avoiding any
exposure to liability for emotional distress damages. 341
335. Streseman, supra note 38, at 1272.
336. See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing the trial court's finding of
waiver in part because the plaintiff had withdrawn his emotional distress claim); Doe v. Mercer
Island Sch. Dist., No. 400, No. C06-395JLR, 2006 WL 3361777, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2006)
(noting that the plaintiff dropped his emotional damages claim).
337. Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
338. Id.
339. Id.: see also Krocka v. City of Chi., 193 F.R.D. 542, 544 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (imposing limita-
tions similar to those in Santelli). r,
340. Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
341. See Santelli, 188 F.R.D. at 309 (noting that the plaintiff's success in avoiding waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was "a meager victory," because the limitations on the evi-
dence she could offer "may prevent her from fully recovering for her alleged emotional dis-
tress"); see also Covell v. CNG Transmission Corp., 863 F. Supp. 202, 206 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (pre-
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Some courts require plaintiffs to take steps to clarify or curtail their
claims as a condition for enforcement of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. For example, in the recent case of Duck v. Port Jefferson
School District, the magistrate judge ruled that he would deny the de-
fendants' motion to compel disclosure of the plaintiff's mental health
records with respect to those records unrelated to the facts of the case,
provided that [the plaintiff] file a statement that she is seeking only
"garden variety" emotional distress claims, that she does not have
"any permanent emotional distress or damage" from the underlying
events, will not call a mental health expert witness at trial, and has
not suffered any physical injuries as a result of the defendants' al-
leged conduct. 342
The Santelli court noted: "Parties ... know for certain that if they
want to maintain the [psychotherapist-patient] privilege, they cannot
seek emotional distress damages. '343 The question is whether that
kind of certainty is an acceptable consequence of courts' approach to
implied waiver. A psychologist has hypothesized that women likely
scale back their sexual harassment claims for emotional damages and
choose not to offer testimony of an expert witness to avoid findings
that they have waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which
would open up their entire mental health history.344 However, such
strategic decisions will result in juries hearing no expert testimony on
the psychological impact of sexual harassment, potentially undermin-
ing plaintiffs' arguments on both liability and damages. 345 These con-
fined claims also undermine one of the stated goals of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which was enacted after Congress had determined that
"additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace. '346
Jaffee case recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege in which the plaintiff withdrew her
claims for "pain, suffering, etc." during litigation apparently after defendants sought her psycho-
therapy records).
342. Duck v. Port Jefferson Sch. Dist., No. CV07-2224, 2008 WL 222590, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
25, 2008) (ordering the plaintiff to produce all "records relevant to the emotional distress that
she claims in this action"); see also EEOC v. Area Erectors, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 549 (N.D. Il. 2007);
Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 227 (D.N.J. 2000).
343. Santelli, 188 F.R.D. at 309.
344. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 109; see also McDonald & Kulick, supra note 29, at
xxxvii (observing that plaintiffs have responded to defendants' broad access to mental health
records by curtailing their own use of mental health experts in litigation, eliminating one of
defendants' arguments in support of an order compelling disclosure of a plaintiff's mental health
history).
345. Kovera & Cass, supra note 300, at 110.
346. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981). One of the
stated purposes of the statute was "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimina-
tion and unlawful harassment in the workplace." Id. § 3(1).
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For ADA cases in particular, the result could be especially ironic.
The construction of waiver should be more, not less, narrow where the
jury is not being asked to quantify emotional injury or to determine its
cause but only to make a threshold finding of whether someone is
disabled. The purpose of the ADA would be undermined as well if
one subset of people with disabilities-those with mental illness-
found that their valued legal right to prevent disclosure of mental
health treatment records had been quickly discarded solely because
they tried to vindicate their right to be free from discrimination based
on having the conditions for which they received such treatment. 347
As the federal courts emphasize repeatedly, privileges are regarded
with disfavor in the courts. However, once we have determined that a
set of communications is among those warranting the protection of a
privilege, that protection must be meaningful. Courts and defendants
are unrealistic in their demand for cost-free privileges. There is no
question that there is a cost imposed by maintaining the secrecy of a
certain kind of relevant evidence, but finding waiver and compelling
disclosure of psychotherapy records are not cost-free alternatives.
Such actions broadly discourage people with a history of mental
health treatment from seeking the full range of remedies available
through federal litigation for deprivation of their rights under the
Constitution or the civil rights laws enacted by Congress. Indeed, one
district court explicitly adopting the narrow approach to waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege reasoned that "for policy reasons, a
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not be narrowly
construed, particularly in civil rights cases where Congress has placed
much importance on litigants' access to the courts and the remedial
nature of such suits. ' 348 As Justice Goldberg noted in Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, a court cannot conclude that "a plaintiff has waived a right by
exercising his right of access to the federal courts. '349
B. An Alternative Approach to Waiver
In order to serve a rights-vindicating instrumental rationale, and to
limit the other costs of an uncertain privilege-most notably the bur-
den on courts and litigants to litigate the issue of waiver repeatedly-
347. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000) (stating that one purpose of the ADA is "to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individ-
uals with disabilities."). Cf Smith, supra note 323, at 71-72 (arguing that requiring ADA plain-
tiffs to provide medical proof of their disability serves to disempower people with disabilities by,
among other things, compelling them to disclose detailed information regarding their disabilities
and suggesting that the requirement may deter people from pursuing ADA claims).
348. Fitzgerald v. Cassil. 216 F.R.D. 632, 639 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
349. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964).
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most federal courts will need to change course entirely in their ap-
proach to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.3 50  The fol-
lowing proposed approach addresses the most common scenarios in
which these questions arise; namely, during discovery of psychother-
apy records, when a plaintiff has sought a motion for a protective or-
der, a plaintiff or psychotherapist files a motion to quash a subpoena,
or a defendant files a motion to compel responses to discovery
requests.
When a plaintiff resists a defendant's request for current or past
mental health records, the first step in the analysis should be an initial
determination, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, of
whether such records are in fact within the scope of permissible dis-
covery. As noted above, courts generally fail to consider that, even if
a party has apparently waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
Rule 26 nonetheless permits discovery only of information reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and fur-
nishes a basis to shield certain information from discovery based upon
considerations of privacy, embarrassment, oppression, and burden.351
At the outset, therefore, the court should consider whether all or any
of the information sought by the defendant is "relevant to the claim or
defense of any party. ' 352 As discussed above, while this is a broad
standard, courts should not fail to consider-and should require de-
fendants to demonstrate-that the information sought is in fact rele-
vant.3 5 3 At this stage, the court can consider the time frame of the
records sought and the relation to the plaintiff's claims and facts al-
leged in the action.354 For example, a court may conclude that the
documents sought are too distant in time from the events at issue in
the litigation or that the records are simply unrelated to any of the
issues in dispute.355
350. At least one pair of commentators has suggested that states have taken a more accepting
view of the privilege and a far narrower view of waiver. Kent & Kent, supra note 195, at 480
(noting that Michigan was one of the few states in which a claim for emotional distress alone was
considered to have effectuated a waiver of the physician-patient privilege).
351. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
352. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
353. Id.
354. An example of a court giving a narrow view of the scope of discovery where psychother-
apy records are in issue is Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md.
1997). The court noted that even where a patient has put her "mental condition at issue" she
"has a right to have discovery limited to information that is directly relevant to the lawsuit" and
therefore the scope of the inquiry would be limited to the extent to which the defendant's con-
duct caused her alleged harm. Id. at 709.
355. See generally 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 244, § 2009, at 124 ("A specific request for
discovery is measured by the court against the background of a specific case. What may be
relevant, and subject to discovery, in one case of a certain type may be irrelevant in another
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Specifically, there is little basis to require disclosure of mental
health records that predate the incident at question in a particular
case, unless such records served as the basis for a testifying expert's
opinion, as discussed below. Courts should carefully evaluate a defen-
dant's "alternative sources of emotional distress" argument to deter-
mine if such evidence could in fact be used properly to avoid liability
or to argue for reduced damages under theories of causation and ap-
portionment. A preexisting mental health condition does not entitle a
defendant access to a plaintiff's entire mental health history to fish for
past stressors, trauma, diagnoses, personality disorders, or other facts
that could be used to discredit the plaintiff. A defendant must make a
specific showing of the relevancy of such past records to a claim or
defense asserted by the parties, even if the current treating psycho-
therapist created the records. 35 6 Thus, considerations of relevancy are
appropriate in the overall analysis of a dispute regarding the discovery
of mental health records, but only with respect to the scope of discov-
ery, not to whether there has been a waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.
Rule 26 provides other limitations on discovery as well. A court
may, "for good cause," issue an order "to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense. ' 357 A litigant's privacy interests may be considered as part of
this analysis. 358 Prior to Jaffee, when the existence of a privilege was
far more in doubt and Rule 26 served as plaintiffs' primary means of
avoiding disclosure of psychotherapy records, courts were much more
willing to consider Rule 26 arguments to limit the scope of discovery
of such records. 359 Since Jaffee, however, the discussion focuses al-
most entirely on waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege with
little discussion of the outer limits of the scope of discovery. How-
seemingly-similar case."). See, e.g., Scaife v. Boenne, 191 F.R.D. 590, 592 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (de-
nying discovery requests on basis of relevance); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 981 F. Supp. 1406,
1408 (D.N.M. 1997) (limiting the scope of party's discovery request on the basis of relevance).
356. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1294 (8th Cir. 1997). Assuming that the
court also finds a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it should consider conducting
an in camera review of the records to determine whether they meet the Rule 26 definition of
relevance. See Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 570 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
357. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
358. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984); see also Kunstler v. City of
New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that, even
in the absence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, Rule 26 gives the court discretion to limit
defendant's access to "what is plainly very sensitive information").
359. See, e.g., Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l., 163 F.R.D. 617, 621 (D. Utah 1995) (holding that
defendant's access to plaintiff's psychotherapy records in sexual harassment action would be
limited to those reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, which would be deter-
mined by the court after an in camera review).
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ever, there is no reason to disregard notions of privacy in making ini-
tial determinations of whether the information sought is properly the
subject of discovery. 360
If the records fall within the scope of discovery under Rule 26, the
next matter to consider is whether they are covered by the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, and specifically whether the discovery
sought consists of "confidential communications between a psycho-
therapist and her patient."'361 This is a determination made without
reference to fairness or necessity and considers only whether the
records reflect communications made "in the course of diagnosis or
treatment" by a "licensed psychotherapist. '362 If the privilege does
not apply, then the plaintiff may be ordered to produce the informa-
tion sought.
Assuming, however, that these two questions are answered in the
affirmative-that the information sought falls within the scope of dis-
covery and also is covered by the psychotherapist-patient privilege-
the court should next consider a defendant's arguments that the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege has been waived through some action of
the plaintiff. Many courts impose on the plaintiff the burden of dis-
proving waiver. 363 This approach is misplaced. Courts uniformly view
the burden of proving the existence of the privilege (i.e. that there was
a psychotherapist-patient relationship and that the communications
were confidential) as being properly imposed on the party asserting
the privilege. 364 However, a waiver, or lack thereof, is not an "essen-
tial element" of the privilege itself. Rather, it occurs only through
affirmative conduct of the person asserting privilege after the commu-
nication has occurred and has the effect of vitiating the waiver.365
360. For example, records detailing communications concerning sexual dysfunction might be
the subject of a protective order where such dysfunction is not an issue in the litigation.
361. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1995). See United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044,
1048-49 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1638 (2006); United States v. Schwensow, 151
F.3d 650, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that communications with alcoholics anonymous tele-
phone volunteers do not fall within the privilege).
362. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
363. See, e.g., Miles v. Century 21 Real Estate LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088 GTE, 2006 WL
2711534, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006); James v. Harris County, 237 F.R.D. 606, 609 (S.D. Tex.
2006); Merrill v. Waffle House Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 474 (N.D. Tex. 2005); Fitzgerald v. Cassil,
216 F.R.D. 632, 636 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105,
1108 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
364. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.3.1, at 524-25 ("It is well-settled that the person
claiming the privilege has the ultimate burden of proof under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)
on all . . . elements.").
365. Federal courts are generally divided on the issue of which party bears the burden of
proof on the issue of waiver of a privilege. Id. § 6.12.2, at 844-46. Some courts assume that the
burden should be borne by the party with the better access to information and evidence about
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Thus., the burden of showing waiver should fall on the party asserting
that such subsequent action has occurred, rather than requiring the
privilege holder to prove a negative. 366
In order to determine whether the party asserting that there was a
waiver has met its burden, the court should focus solely on the actions
of the privilege holder, generally the plaintiff. The inquiry is whether
the plaintiff voluntarily took steps that can be properly viewed as ef-
fectuating a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 367 The
easiest cases in which to find a waiver are those where the plaintiff has
specifically authorized disclosure of the communications, or where the
plaintiff indicates an intention to use the privileged communications
as evidence to support her claim, such as to demonstrate damages or
the fact of a disability. She may do so by designating a psychothera-
pist as an expert witness, producing mental health records through au-
tomatic disclosure or otherwise in the discovery process, 368 signing
release forms, or turning the records over to third parties who are not
covered by that or another privilege.369
If the defendant argues that a waiver is implied by other conduct,
courts should consider whether a plaintiff has truly attempted to use
"the privilege as a sword instead of a shield. ' '370 Where the plaintiff
seeks no claim to recover for payment of mental health treatment re-
lated to the accident and lists no mental health provider as a witness,
there can generally be no finding that the plaintiff has made an "of-
the circumstances of a waiver, which would be the holder of the privilege. Id. § 6.12.2, at 845.
Other courts have set forth a burden-shifting analysis under which after the privilege holder has
demonstrated the existence of the privilege itself, a burden of "going forward" shifts to the other
party which must produce evidence upon which a fact finder could find that the privilege has
been waived. See, e.g., Carmona v. State, 947 S.w.2d 661, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
366. See Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1999) ("The party seeking to overcome
the privilege bears the burden of establishing that the privilege has been waived.").
367. See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that there was no waiver
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by the plaintiff where "nothing in the record [ suggests
that [the plaintiff] made a knowing election to waive" the privilege).
368. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (describing categories of information and docu-
ments that must be provided even in the absence of a specific discovery request): FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2) (information to be disclosed regarding any potential trial witness who may offer expert
opinion testimony); FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (interrogatories to be answered under oath) FED. R. Civ.
P. 34 (request for production of documents).
369. Providing records to her attorney would not limit a plaintiff's ability to later claim privi-
lege since communications with her attorney are themselves covered by a privilege. IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 859-60.
370. Johnson, 977 P.2d at 157; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and
the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (1986) ("[Tlhe principle concern is selective use of
privileged materials to garble the truth, which mandates giving the opponent access to related
privileged material to set the record straight.") (referring to the attorney-client privilege).
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fensive use of the privilege" upon which a court could infer waiver.371
And where an act effectuating waiver is found, it should operate as an
implied waiver only as to confidential communications connected to
such waiver.
Thus, even where a plaintiff lists a mental health professional as an
expert witness, the scope of the privilege waiver reaches only those
communications upon which the expert bases her opinion.372 In the
case of a treating psychotherapist offering an opinion, this would nec-
essarily include communications between the plaintiff and the psycho-
therapist. Similarly, if the treating or consulting therapist reviewed
notes and records from other treatment and relied upon those in
reaching the expert opinions to be offered at trial, such records would
also be subject to discovery. However, if the psychotherapist has not
relied upon the treatment records of other psychotherapists, then
there is no basis to use waiver as a rationale for requiring disclo-
sure.373 A defendant may ask the plaintiff whether she has sought any
other mental health treatment, and an expert's failure to review or
consider other diagnostic impressions and treatment records is cer-
tainly fair fodder for cross-examination, but it does not warrant a
court order compelling plaintiff to produce the content of such other
treatment records. 374
A court cannot assume that any claim for emotional harm or mental
disability will necessarily involve expert testimony. Unquestionably, a
plaintiff can present emotional distress testimony without expert testi-
mony375 or offer her own testimony in support of claim of mental disa-
371. Johnson, 977 P.2d at 157.
372. A party is entitled to discovery of "the data or other information considered by the [op-
posing party's designated expert] witness in forming [her] opinions." FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(B).
373. If a party withholds psychotherapy records from the expert witness, such records would
not be subject to discovery under either Rule 26 or as a result of waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. The court in Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1999), while
finding no waiver, rejected the "narrow waiver rule." because it would "enable a party who had
undergone psychotherapy to offer at trial only the testimony of a retained, non-treating expert
and thereby prevent discovery of what she had told her treating psychotherapist." Id. at 308.
This ability to present only a "selective 'history"' of one's mental health treatment would
"thwart the truth seeking process by using the privilege as both a shield and a sword." Id. While
the court may not approve of the result of the recognition of the privilege in Jaffee, the basic
principles underlying privileges and waivers would indeed result in restricted access to poten-
tially relevant information. See supra notes 218-259 and accompanying text.
374. In addition, the opposing party may take the deposition of an expert designated by the
plaintiff. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) ("A party may depose any person who has been identified as
an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.").
375. DOBBS, supra note 24, at 832 ("[Mledical testimony is not ordinarily required to demon-
strate either the severity of [severe emotional distress] or its cause."). See also Lewis R. Hagood,
Claims of Mental and Emotional Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 29 U. MEM. L.
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bility;376 she may therefore choose to forego calling a treating or
evaluating psychotherapist.3 7 Jurors can infer emotional distress
from the fact of discrimination alone. A plaintiff's decision not to des-
ignate her treating psychotherapist may ultimately make it more diffi-
cult for her to convince a jury as to the degree of her emotional
distress, or the fact that she is disabled, but that is her choice to
make.378 Defense attorneys can use cross-examination, testimony of
other witnesses, and argument to attack to the sufficiency of the plain-
tiff's claim.379 The key is to put the control of the issue in the hands of
the party with the burden of proof as part of the strategy for the pros-
ecution of her case.
A defendant may demonstrate implied waiver of certain records by
pointing to a plaintiff's claim for recovery of the cost of treatment, but
such waiver will only extend to communications directly relating to
such costs. Courts should not be too quick to conclude that a plaintiff
seeks such compensation based upon the typical, broad language
found in the civil complaint's damages clause. 380 A better approach is
to require defendants to show that a plaintiff has made such claims
through statements included in Rule 26(a)(1) "Initial Disclosures, '38 '
or through answers to interrogatories or deposition testimony contain-
ing explanations from plaintiffs of the nature of the claims they will be
REV. 577, 582 (1999) (noting that federal courts generally do not require plaintiffs to offer expert
testimony in support of claim for emotional or psychological damages); Walker v. Mac Frugals
Bargains, Closeouts, Inc., No. Civ. A. 93-4135, 1994 WL 693387, at *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1994)
(denying employer's motion for summary judgment and noting that "while it will ultimately be
plaintiff's burden to prove that the harassment proximately caused her alleged [emotional] inju-
ries, she can do so without expert medical testimony.").
376. See generally Smith, supra note 323 (arguing that courts may not require ADA plaintiffs
to offer expert medical evidence to establish a prima facie case of disability).
377. See, e.g., Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996). See also
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 ("[E]xpert testimony is not essential to litigate the
validity of [emotional distress] damages claims."); Enforcement Guidance, supra note 260, 1
6226.
378. See Hagood, supra note 375, at 583-85, 589. An absence of expert testimony in support
of claims may also make any award more vulnerable to attack on appeal. Id.
379. Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 531 (N.D. Il. 1999) ("[Ilt may be that the
plaintiff-without the benefit of medical testimony-will be compromised in his efforts to per-
suade the jury that he has emotional distress that was caused by the defendants, and that is not
instead the product of his preexisting condition. However, that will be for the jury to decide at a
later time."); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 884 (noting that although privi-
leged information may be "logically relevant" to a plaintiff's claims, defense counsel has "alter-
native means" either to "attack the weight of the plaintiff's damages evidence or to suggest an
alternative cause").
380. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).
381. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). For example, plaintiffs must provide the opposing party "a
computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party" at the outset of the
discovery period. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
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pursuing. A court may find waiver only where, through such state-
ments, the plaintiff has indicated that she intends to include such spe-
cific amounts in her damage claims.
But even where a waiver is found, however, a court must nonethe-
less take steps to limit disclosure and ensure that there is a direct link
between the plaintiff's actions leading to waiver and the records for
which the privilege has been waived-the actual confidential commu-
nications she intends to use to support her claim. Thus, if a plaintiff
includes a claim for recovery of the costs of certain mental health
treatment, the waiver only extends to certain records regarding such
treatment. For example, the billing, treatment plan, diagnostic im-
pression, and similar documents may demonstrate that the costs were
incurred for the alleged injury. Courts should not compel disclosure
of treatment notes and psychological examinations, which are likely
the most sensitive records, if the implied waiver is based solely upon
seeking payment for psychotherapy. 38 2
A court may not conclude that the plaintiff has waived the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege based solely upon a plaintiff's claim for
emotional distress damages, a separate claim for negligent or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, or an allegation that she is dis-
abled on the basis of a mental illness. In many, if not most, cases in
which a plaintiff puts forth such claims and allegations, she will desig-
nate her psychotherapist or a consulting mental health professional as
a testifying expert witness to support the claims. Because such expert
testimony is not required, however, a plaintiff who has sought treat-
ment, perhaps for the emotional distress caused by the defendant's
misconduct and perhaps at another time in her life, may choose not to
offer the testimony of a past or current psychotherapist.
Thus, absent use of such confidential communications in support of
her claim, a court should not conclude that a plaintiff has waived the
psychotherapist-patient privilege with respect to those communica-
tions. Unquestionably, such psychotherapists may have relevant and
revealing evidence to offer the fact finder, and such a reading of
waiver would keep the evidence from the fact finder. 383 But basing a
382. A plaintiff would likely offer in evidence some record of payment for treatment in sup-
port of such claim.
383. See Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, *11-12 (S.D.N.Y.
2006). The court explained:
In rejecting the at-issue argument pressed by defendants, we note that, in substance, it
rests on the notion that access to treatment records might, in some not-too-specifically
defined way, be helpful to defendants in preparing to rebut plaintiffs' damage case. To
accept this notion as the touchstone of waiver would be inconsistent with the far more
demanding standards generally recognized for at-issue waiver of other privileges, and
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finding of waiver upon mere allegations of emotional harm is inconsis-
tent with underlying principles of absolute privileges and waiver in
American law. 384 As Professor Imwinkelried has noted with respect
to waiver of testimonial privileges, the fundamental issue should be
whether a litigant "introduces trial testimony that expressly or implic-
itly discloses substance of the protected communications. '385
Even where a court finds a waiver, the court should take additional
measures to protect litigants and to follow the broader aims of discov-
ery and litigation. Rule 26 not only provides that certain information
is entirely outside the scope of discovery, as discussed above, but it
also authorizes trial judges to exercise their discretion to ensure that
discovery is pursued fairly and appropriately. 386 For example, courts
should consider limitations on the disclosure of the plaintiff's confi-
dential statements made during the course of litigation to enable the
would be particularly inappropriate in view of the very strong emphasis of the Supreme
Court on the notion that this particular privilege is not a conditional one, that is, not
one that can be set aside on the basis of a party's showing of need. If need alone does
not justify waiver, still less can a speculative definition of conceivable relevance be
sufficient to justify eviscerating this privilege.
Id. Further, enforcement of the privilege does not necessarily require exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence pertaining to a plaintiff's mental health and other potential causes of emo-
tional distress. Defense counsel remains free to inquire regarding these areas-with some limi-
tations, such as those set forth under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and Civil Procedure Rule 26,
more generally-in depositions and on cross-examination. Bernabei & Schroader, supra note 5,
at 33. Defense counsel may depose or call at trial other witnesses to testify regarding a plain-
tiff's emotional health. Fasman, supra note 37, at 537. A plaintiff may find that she has painted
herself into a corner by not offering testimony or records from her treating psychotherapist.
384. See supra notes 133-155 and accompanying text. Further, because the state of the law of
waiver based solely upon claims for emotional distress is so unsettled, arguably, one cannot
knowingly waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege by including a claim for emotional distress
in her prayer for relief on a complaint. In effect, courts fail to offer proper disclosure when they
find implied waiver given the current state of the law. See Berg, supra note 135, at 322-23.
385. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 885 (emphasis added).
386. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26(c), "Protective Orders," provides the following, nonexclusive
list of measures that a trial court may take "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense":
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery;
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking
discovery;
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or dis-
covery to certain matters;
(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted;
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order;
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or com-
mercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and
(H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information
in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs.
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plaintiff to continue such treatment without concern that her state-
ments will be subjected to scrutiny. 387 Thus, if treatment is ongoing,
any records created after the request for discovery should remain con-
fidential and there should be no continuing disclosure requirement or
subsequent request for records absent a specific showing for good
cause. 388 Similarly, any and all references to the litigation itself,389 re-
gardless of when created, may be redacted. Disclosure certainly
would chill the sessions once a plaintiff knows that all records will be
subject to a continuing disclosure requirement.
Courts should also limit review of any mental health information
obtained in discovery, including deposition testimony, to the parties'
attorneys, absent a special showing of need, and courts should further
require that attorneys not offer the information in support of a motion
for summary judgment or at trial without the court's prior authoriza-
tion.390 To the extent that such records are filed in support of a mo-
tion, the court should seal and redact the filings to limit access to such
information through users of PACER-the federal courts' on-line case
filing system-or online legal research services. All of these require-
ments should be contained in a standard Protective Order issued upon
the request of a party in a civil case in which mental health records
may be sought or produced. Further, because a Rule 35 exam would
be far less intrusive in many instances, courts can give plaintiffs who
seek damages for ongoing and future psychiatric injury the option of
387. For example, courts should afford plaintiffs some level of protection against discovery of
statements such as those admitted at trial in Maday v. Public Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815,
820 (6th Cir. 2007), discussed supra at note 41. The marginal probative value of such statements
to the central issues in dispute is slight compared with the potential injury to both a psychother-
apy-patient relationship and the attorney-client relationship.
388. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (requiring supplementation of prior discovery responses under
certain circumstances); Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 708 (D. Md. 1997)
(granting motion to quash subpoena of records of treating psychotherapist based upon "serious
concerns that the disclosures will adversely affect [the plaintiff's] psychiatric treatment").
389. Plaintiffs may discuss or refer to-expressly or impliedly-any otherwise privileged com-
munications in the context of communications with their attorneys. Since they are only disclos-
ing the communications in the context of another privileged communication, there is no waiver
of the attorney-client privilege. IMWINKELRiED, supra note 46, § 6.12.4, at 859-60. Accordingly,
in order to provide an additional level of protection against possible disclosure of such communi-
cations, or, more generally, the mental impressions and strategies of the plaintiff and her attor-
ney, courts should guard against disclosure of such discussions.
390. See Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 570 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering magistrate
to conduct initial in camera review of psychotherapy records to determine "if, and to what ex-
tent, the evidence is relevant to [the plaintiff's] claim for emotional distress" and upon the re-
lease of the records to "place an appropriate protective order on the materials to preserve the
confidentiality of the medical information"); see also In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 572 (Cal.
1970) (suggesting that a protective order may be appropriate where psychotherapy records are
disclosed).
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submitting to such an examination in lieu of producing records of
treatment. 39' Finally, courts can tie the production of documents to
the prospect of a trial.392
The approach advocated here is not only consistent with principles
of privileges and waiver, but it also provides several important advan-
tages to litigants and the courts. While court rules and legal principles
must of course provide flexibility to fit the wide range of scenarios
that may arise in a case, all participants in litigation-and those con-
templating or facing possible litigation-benefit from some degree of
certainty on the questions that are likely to arise.393 At this time in
the federal courts, there is little, if any, certainty as to how a judge or
magistrate may approach a dispute over the application and waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege in civil litigation. As a result,
waiver disputes must be litigated repeatedly, with no resolution of the
broader questions raised by these controversies. 394
391. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(C) (authorizing a court to "prescribe[e] a discovery method
other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery"); Vasconcellos, 962 F. Supp. at 709
(granting motion to quash subpoena of psychotherapy records where plaintiff volunteered to
undergo a psychiatric examination).
392. In Dominguez-Silva v. Harvey, No. Civ:3:04-CV-135-JTC, 2006 WL 826091, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 23, 2006), for example, the court concluded that there had been a waiver of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege due to the plaintiff's inclusion of a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but the court ruled that the plaintiff would not be compelled to disclose his
mental health records unless and until his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
survived the pending motion for summary judgment since the records were not needed for sum-
mary judgment purposes. See also Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 558 (N.D.
Ga. 2001).
393. Since there are conflicts within the same district on this issue, litigants can enjoy some
certainty only if there is a prior decision by the same judge or magistrate. However, given the
number of recent cases in the courts of appeals, which appear to set forth rules but which pro-
vide little analysis, see supra notes 183-186 and accompanying text, there is an increased chance
that some lower courts will feel compelled to reverse themselves.
394. While this Article focuses on discovery of mental health records, because that is usually
the juncture at which these issues arise, a court should also consider the impact on the plaintiff
and her psychotherapy to the extent that such information is used as trial evidence. It is one
thing to order disclosure subject to a protective order of such communications. It is quite an-
other to permit the admissibility of such communications at trial, which may be attended by the
public and the media. Comprehensive treatment of the issue of admissibility of mental health
records at trial is beyond the scope of this Article, but I would note that courts should be con-
scious of the potential misuse of such evidence by jurors and employ Federal Rule of Evidence
403 or other rules of evidence to guard against such misuse. See In re Lifshutz, 467 P.2d 557,
572-73 (Cal 1970) (suggesting that Rule 403 discretion should be exercised with respect to the
compelled testimony of a treating psychotherapist "to provide substantial protection for the pa-
tient's legitimate interests").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege impli-
cates a collision of competing aims. The Supreme Court in Jaffee rec-
ognized the importance of mental health treatment, both to the
individual patient and to society.395 The federal statutes underlying
the plaintiffs' claims in the cases in which waiver issues arise were
broadly designed to discourage and to remedy unlawful discrimination
and deprivations of federally protected rights. At the same time, our
court system's central aim is to facilitate a search for the truth, as re-
flected in a litigant's broad right to obtain discovery from other par-
ties. As a result of this truth-seeking objective, evidentiary
privileges-legal rights that necessarily inhibit access to the truth-are
regarded with disfavor. However, as one commentator noted more
than twenty years ago with respect to courts' construction of the attor-
ney-client privilege: "loss of privilege protection should be justified
by something more than antipathy toward the privilege." 396 This ob-
servation equally captures the central problem with the conceptualiza-
tion of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal
courts today.
While truth-seeking is unquestionably a central and important ob-
ject of federal litigation, it cannot be invoked in ways that undermine
the predominant goal of facilitating justice. Courts must ensure that
those litigants who have sought mental health treatment are not dis-
suaded from seeking vindication of their rights through the federal
courts merely because they fear that their mental health history will
become the focus of discovery and trial. 397 As one federal magistrate
judge noted: "Treating claims for incidental emotional damages as
waivers of the [psychotherapist-patient] privilege unfairly disadvan-
tages those litigants who seek mental health counseling services as
compared to otherwise identical litigants who refrain from seeking
professional counseling. '398 Courts must take an approach that fol-
lows the precedent set down by the Supreme Court in Jaffee and the
legal traditions regarding both the enforcement and waiver of rights,
while preserving the federal courts as a place where all litigants, re-
395. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
396. Marcus, supra note 370, at 1607.
397. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999) ("Amongst those in our populace who,
through no fault of their own, find themselves on the plaintiff side of a tort case, there will
always be a certain proportion who have sought counseling for unrelated personal problems or
who are suffering from unrelated emotional difficulties.").
398. Morrisette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D. Me. Aug.
21, 2001).
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gardless of their mental health history, can fairly seek compensation
for injuries.
Indeed, such reform will likely be ineffective unless it originates
with the Supreme Court itself, which has thus far declined to grant
certiorari on the question of the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 399 The Court must set a course for lower courts on this im-
portant question. Absent such guidance, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege recognized in Jaffee will continue to be "uncertain" and,
therefore, "little better than no privilege at all."' 400 Federal court-
houses will continue to be effectively shut to many potential civil
rights plaintiffs with a history of mental illness.
399. See, e.g., Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 127 S. Ct. 1815 (2007).
400. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
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